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ABSTRACT 
The DPRK’s nuclear issue is difficult to be managed in a peaceful way because of 
the negative aspects of nuclear proliferation, unacceptable not only on the Korean 
Peninsula but also in the international community. North Korea, the U.S., Japan, and 
Russia have sharply divided views on the solution to North Korea’s nuclear issue. In 
particular, given the bilateral and multilateral talks in history, despite small progress, it 
seems that the U.S. and North Korea cannot bridge the gap of understanding. Therefore, 
this study comes to the conclusion that nuclear issues cannot be resolved under the 
mistrust that has lasted for half a century, given that North Korea and the U.S. consider 
each other archrivals. Even though it will take a long time, scaling down the deep-rooted 
mistrust through “negotiations” and “engagement” remains the most realistic option for 
both sides. Changing leadership in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea will usher related 
parties into another chapter of opportunity to end the North Korean nuclear conundrum—
this time, surely with more carrots than sticks.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of the North Korean 
nuclear impasse on Northeast Asia based on nuclear proliferation theory. An examination 
of the influence of the North Korean nuclear threat on neighboring powers and the 
international community, as well as regional and international positions and policies to 
resolve the crisis, can suggest a desirable direction of development to maintain a peaceful 
Korean peninsula. At the same time, this thesis will offer a basic foundation to predict the 
possibility of cooperation between neighboring states and North Korea.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
There are manifold elements threatening peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula, among which North Korea’s nuclear program has recently stood out in terms 
of its disruptive impact. Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship is the paramount 
destabilizing factor in Northeast Asian politics. The DPRK’s October 9, 2006, nuclear 
test illustrated the danger its “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and nuclear 
programs pose to … peace and security in Northeast Asia.”1 By increasing security 
tension, North Korea prompts its neighboring countries to employ a variety of hedging 
strategies. 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program upsets the balance of 
Northeast Asian peace. For the United States, as a “uni-hegemon,”2 resolution of the 
North Korean nuclear issue is a face-saving opportunity and, considering its implications 
for the threat of nuclear terrorism, stopping North Korean nuclear proliferation has 
become more important than before. China, for its part, devotes itself to balancing U.S. 
power. By providing leadership in the settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
                                                 
1 Nicholas R. Burns, U.S. Policy towards North Korea, Testimony to the House International Relations 
Committee, http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/76178.htm (accessed March 13, 2007). 
2 Here I term the United States as a “uni-hegemon” because it is broadly conceived as either the top 
country in a unipolar world or at least a hegemon in a variety of regions, including East Asia. 
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China is certain to expand its influence as a hegemon in Asia. North Korea’s proven 
nuclear capability has fueled Japanese discussion about revising its pacifist constitution 
and rearming, even to the point of developing its own nuclear weapons.3 Japanese 
security and nuclear normalization would increase tensions not only between Japan and 
the DPRK, but also between Japan and China, and Japan and the ROK. The two Koreas’ 
relations have changed according to changes in relations between North Korea and the 
United States, as seen in the first and second nuclear crises of North Korea starting in 
1993. Compounding the challenge of managing this situation, each and every state 
pursues its own national interests.  
Therefore, as a result of there being a number of concerned parties, each with a 
different and sometimes conflicting perspective, the North Korean nuclear issue has 
developed into an all the more complicated situation. In this context, the sole peaceful 
channel to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis is the six-way talks. The second phase of 
the fourth round of talks produced the September 19 (2005) joint statement, bringing 
hope for solving the nuclear crisis in a peaceful way. The third phase of the fifth round of 
talks resulted in the February 13 (2007) agreement which resolved the stalemate on the 
Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue and thereby obtained an agreement from North Korea to 
denuclearize again. But prospects for implementation of this agreement remain dubious.  
In this vein, considering North Korea's nuclear breakout, culminating in its 
October 2006 nuclear test, it is worthwhile to ponder the impact of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis on Northeast Asia. Because it is unlikely that Kim Jong-il will be willing to 
negotiate away the entirety of his nuclear weapons programs—at least in the near 
future—evaluating this issue continues to be important.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on available literature, this thesis will introduce nuclear proliferation theory 
as a theoretical background for the study of the impact of the nuclear crisis on Northeast 
Asia. This is because the possibility of further nuclear proliferation is the most serious 
                                                 
3 Dae-woong Jin, “Nuke Test Could Give Momentum to Japan's Rearmament,” The Korea Herald, 
http://w3.nexis.com/new/results/docview (accessed October 10, 2006).  
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and worrisome aspect of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Therefore, this thesis will begin 
by introducing the impact of nuclear proliferation. More specifically, for this theory there 
is no united view among scholars on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on 
international peace and security, with the debate centering on two camps. One argument 
is optimistic, anchored in the logic of deterrence: if all states had nuclear weapons, each 
state would be less likely to wage war out of fear of the consequences.4 The other adopts 
the pessimistic view that the more states that acquire nuclear weapons, the higher the 
likelihood that they will be used.  
1. Proliferation Optimist: Deterrence Proponent 
Since the only application of nuclear weapons in interstate conflict at the 
conclusion of World War II, the most essential effect of nuclear weapons on global 
security has been to deter a nuclear exchange (nuclear weapons certainly have not 
prevented war). Here, “deterrence” means the decision to give up nuclear weapons by 
political leaders based on their assessment of their state's own capabilities and the likely 
results of war.5 If leaders believe that a first strike could lead to victory, deterrence fails 
regardless of how great the counterpart's capabilities. Likewise, if the leaders of one state 
believe that a first strike can neutralize an opponent’s ability to launch a retaliatory strike, 
deterrence would have no effect. Thus this theory consists of two major concepts: first 
strike and retaliatory second strike. Deterrence was effective in preventing war between 
the United States and the Soviet Union because neither had a first strike capability that 
could neutralize its adversary and both had the capability to launch a second retaliatory 
strike after the counterpart’s first strike.6 If both countries had only possessed 
                                                 
4 An equality (nuclear proliferation=higher chance of nuclear war) is the overwhelmingly supported 
view among scholars who study whether nuclear proliferation would influence international politics and 
politicians of existing nuke states. This logic is like that if “n+1 states” went nuclear, the world would be 
more unstable than if “n states” went nuclear. Therefore, existing nuke states claim that such a situation 
should be prevented. As a representative scholar, Kenneth N. Waltz argued that war is caused by unclear 
evaluation of an enemy’s capacity, so by possessing nuclear weapons, military capacity is clearly assessed. 
Scholar Morton A. Kaplan assumed the “Unit Veto System,” in which nuclear proliferation is completed to 
some degree that any states can deny other states’ intention, whereby war can be deterred. 
5 Robert Jervis, et al., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1985). 
6 Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,” Survival vol. 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994-1995), 161-163. 
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conventional weapons at the time of the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the world could very 
likely have experienced World War III. We should then acknowledge that the existence 
of nuclear weapons likely contributed to the prevention of a major war between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
2. Proliferation Pessimist: Deterrence Opponent 
The equality of “nuclear proliferation=higher chance of nuclear war” is the 
overwhelmingly supported view among scholars who study whether nuclear proliferation 
would influence international politics and the leaders of nuclear-capable states. This logic 
is that if “n+1 states” go nuclear, the probability of an outbreak of nuclear war occurring 
would be higher than the case of only “n states” going nuclear. Therefore, existing 
nuclear states claim that any increase in the number of nuclear weapons states should be 
prevented. The claim that an increase in the number of nuclear states would lead to a 
reduction in stability is based on an arithmetic logic. The political logic contains the idea 
that potential nuke states are the small and weak ones controlled by “unreliable leaders” 
and thus more likely to resort to nuclear war.7 This is because, conceivably, North 
Korea’s going nuclear is more threatening than Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons.  
Since 1976, in fact, there have only been five nations listed in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as internationally legitimate nuclear states. The United States, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China were so-called member states 
of the nuclear club. There have been many states mentioned since the 1970s in terms of 
capability and probability of nuclear armament, such as Israel, Germany, Brazil, India, 
Pakistan, Argentina, South Africa, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and North Korea.8 One 
problem caused by a number of the potential nuclear states listed above going nuclear 
results from their political instability. In the case of a domestically unstable regime the 
concern is that their control of their nuclear arsenal would also be unstable. This is 
because states that are not politically stable pose the risk that their nuclear weapons could 
                                                 
7 Donald M. Snow, The Shadow of the Mushroom Shaped Cloud (Columbus Ohio: The Ohio State 
University, 1978), 23. 
8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Preventing Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation 
(Stockholm: SIPRI, 1975), 7-20.  
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fall into the hands of insurgents or rogue elements within the regime. Moreover, leaders 
of non-democratic nuclear states driven by an internal or external crisis might be more 
likely to cause an international conflict to divert attention from domestic problems than a 
democratic state.  
Based on these competing theories of nuclear proliferation theory (both theories 
have their own logic, so it is hard to draw any conclusion one way or the other), this 
thesis will analyze the impact of North Korean nuclearization on regional security. First, 
it will explore North Korea’s motivations to develop nuclear weapons from a historical 
standpoint, assessing both internal and external dynamics. It will next examine North 
Korea’s current nuclear policy. Finally, it will analyze the policies of neighboring states 
toward the North Korean nuclear crisis, including the United States and China, and finish 
with an assessment of the six-party-talks framework. Through an evaluation of these 
points, it may be possible to achieve a solution to the North Korean nuclear puzzle and 
develop a foundation from which to step forward towards peace and prosperity on the 
Korean Peninsula—and in East Asia as well  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The main purpose of this thesis as noted above is to evaluate the impact of the 
North Korean nuclear crisis on Northeast Asia based on nuclear proliferation theory, and 
to suggest an optimal approach to resolve the nuclear impasse.  
To this end, this thesis centers on North Korea’s effort to develop nuclear 
weapons. Because problems concerning the North Korean nuclear crisis originally started 
from Pyongyang’s decision to go nuclear, the first issue is “why does North Korea want 
to develop nuclear weapons?” To answer this question, this thesis will deal with the 
implications of nuclear weapons possession for any given state and the way international 
politics change as nuclear weapons proliferate. These questions are the basis of the thesis, 
which will also touch on issues such as the history of the North Korean nuclear weapons 
program, the extent of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability, and the North Korean 
nuclear crisis as a threat to international security. Moreover, this thesis will analyze the  
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root causes of North Korea adapting a policy to develop nuclear weapons and, by so 
doing, attempt to anticipate the future development of the North Korean nuclear issue. 
These issues—or questions—will be dealt with in Chapters I, II, and III. 
Second, in Chapter IV this thesis will address the fundamental issues motivating 
all states involved to strive to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. 
Certainly, it is the United States that is interested in this issue the most. Thus, this thesis 
will investigate in detail U.S. strategies, including its evolving stance on North Korea. In 
addition to the United States, this thesis will study the stances of China, Russia, and 
Japan.  
Third, Chapter V will suggest plausible alternatives for the way ahead. It will 
offer a logical foundation for the possibility of cooperation among surrounding countries 
in order to solve the nuclear conundrum by explaining and analyzing the six-party talks in 
light of the stances of Japan, China, and Russia discussed in Chapter IV. Finally, this 
thesis will attempt to offer a workable approach for the United States to follow to resolve 
the North Korean nuclear impasse. 
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION 
A. FORMATION OF NEW WORLD ORDER AND NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION 
1. Cold War Era  
In 1948, in the aftermath of nuclear bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a 
need for nonproliferation of nuclear weapons emerged based on their formidable 
destructive power. The U.S., Canada, and the U.K. suggested establishing a committee of 
nuclear energy under the United Nations in order to fully eliminate the possibility of 
nuclear energy use for destructive purposes. In the United Nations General Assembly of 
January 1946, all members reached a consensus on banning the possession of nuclear 
weapons individually. The United States also suggested that all nuclear-related materials 
and activities potentially dangerous to world peace and security should be under the 
United Nations’ possession and control. This proposal, called the “Baruch Plan,”9 failed 
to be adopted due to opposition by the Soviet Union because of its fear of a United 
States’ nuclear weapons monopoly. 
Initially, it was thought that, proliferation of nuclear weapons was unlikely to 
spread because nuclear weapons and technology would be difficult to gain. However, as 
the Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 
1964 went nuclear, all permanent members in the current UN Security Council officially 
became nuclear states. There existed widespread awareness that horizontal proliferation 
of nuclear weapons would be a grave threat to world peace and security, resulting from 
the multiplication of conflict areas, violation of orders, and accidents. These concerns 
                                                 
9 The Baruch Plan was a proposal by the U.S. government, written mainly by Bernard Baruch to the 
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) in its first meeting in June 1946 to: 
 
 1) extend between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends; 
 2) implement control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its peaceful nuclear use; 
 3) eliminate from national armaments atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction;  
 4) establish effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States 
     against the hazards of violations and evasions. 
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eventually led to a vote for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)10 in 1968. In 
spite of the control of the NPT regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 11 
founded in 1975, Israel in 1968, India in 1974, and Pakistan in 1978 went nuclear as 
well.12 Exceptionally, the Republic of South Africa produced nuclear weapons in 1970 
but abandoned them in 1990, joining NPT afterwards.13 If North Korea became a 
member of this nuclear club, the number of nuclear states which have nuclear weapons or 
capability would be expanded to nine states including five permanent members in the 
official nuclear club defined by the NPT. However, the more important issue in an era of 
Cold War was not nuclear proliferation but the prevention of all-out nuclear war between 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  
2. Post-Cold War Era  
In the post-Cold War era, nuclear proliferation has become a global issue. 
Therefore, how to stop nuclear proliferation around the world has been one of the most 
essential issues in terms of U.S. foreign policy designed to maintain U.S.-led new world 
order—with less possibility of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union due to 
the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the USSR in the late 1980s. The United 
States regards the third world becoming nuclear or developing weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) as the most important challenge to threaten new world order. In 
1993, Defense Secretary Les Aspin stated that “the new nuclear danger we face is 
                                                 
10 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear 
weapons, opened for signature on July 1, 1968. There are currently 189 states party to the treaty, five of 
which have nuclear weapons: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People's 
Republic of China. Only four nations are not signatories: India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. India and 
Pakistan both possess and have openly tested nuclear bombs. Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding its 
own nuclear weapons program. North Korea ratified the treaty, violated it, and later withdrew. 
11 The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear 
proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon 
development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials. It was founded in 1975 in 
response to the 1974 Indian nuclear test, which demonstrated that certain non-weapons-specific nuclear 
technology could be readily turned to weapons development.  
12 Martin van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive. A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force (New 
York, New York: Public Affairs, 1998), 174; Z. Khalilzad, “Pakistan and the Bomb,” Survival, xxi:6 
(November/December 1979), 244.  
13 Frank V. Pabian, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Lessons for U.S. Nonproliferation 
Policy,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 3, no. 1 (Fall 1995), 1-19. 
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perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states, and the engine of this 
new danger is proliferation.”14 Under such a backdrop, North Korea's nuclear issue was 
very seriously recognized. It is not limited to only the Korean Peninsula or Northeast 
Asia but is regarded as a full-scale challenge to the United States' foreign policy. 
When nuclear proliferation is such that nuclear states are expanded vertically, 
there is no united view of scholars on the resulting impact on peace and security of 
international politics. One view is the arithmetic argument that as the number of nuclear 
states increases, so does the possibility of nuclear war. The other is based on the logic 
that if all states had nuclear weapons, it is highly unlikely that they would threaten enemy 
states and this would restrain war in the end.  
B. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR 
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION  
1. Traits of Nuclear Weapons  
Modern weapons are so varied that there are many ways to categorize them. In 
particular, conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction are two major kinds. 
Tank or armored vehicles and field artillery are the former, while nuclear, chemical, 
biochemical weapons, and ballistic missiles which deliver all these weapons are the latter. 
In the early 1990s, with the demise of the USSR and Eastern European communist 
countries, the world welcomed the post-Cold War era. Although there is unlikely to be 
any nuclear war threat between the U.S. and Russia at present, the world is at an alarming 
level in terms of proliferation of WMDs and their delivery technology with the risk of 
local warfare and low-intensity conflict (LIC) increasing. At present, to begin with, when 
it comes to nuclear weapons, there are five authorized nuclear states, with 16 states 
having suspected nuclear manufacturing capability, 24 states possessing nuclear weapons 
or in the process of developing them. North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya are some of the 
cases in point. All WMDs are a grave threat when a nuclear warhead is combined with 
sophisticated missile delivery means. While it could be possible for submarines or 
                                                 
14 Counterproliferation Initiative Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)/NSC, December 18, 1993, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18 (accessed June 3, 2007). 
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aircraft to be used to convey or drop weapons, the most threatening modern warfare are 
ballistic missiles, which are unmanned weapons. Currently, more than 12 states have 
ballistic missiles able to be launched any time, and more are reportedly developing plans. 
For instance, North Korea sold the 'Scud C missile,' which has a longer shooting distance, 
to Syria and Iran and has agreed to sell it to Libya, too.15 It is safe to say that the world 
now is less dangerous than before. However, it is also undeniable that the world is less 
stable when compared with the Cold War era. Ties of traditional allied powers have been 
loosened not only in Communism nations but also in Western nations. Therefore, many 
are aware that they should strengthen their own military power to include WMDs to 
defend themselves. In addition, WMDs are cheaper than conventional weapons. North 
Korea's conventional weapons power functions as a countermeasure to its counterpart's 
better weapon system.  
The international community has put great effort into preventing proliferation of 
WMDs through the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
in 1968, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, and the Chemical Weapons 
Convention in 1992, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.16 Notable here is that 
Washington officially mentioned ballistic missiles as well as nuclear and biochemical 
weapons as targets of regulation for the first time. This is contrary to the 1993 FM 100-5, 
the US Army doctrine which mentions new operational environments with WMDs but 
only discusses NBC(Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) weapons.17 This seems to be 
based on the awareness of efficiency of the delivery methods as much as on a warhead 
itself. Nuclear weapons are so-called absolute arms, in that nuclear weapons have 
absolute destructive power and it is hard to stop them. If nuclear bombs are used for 
military purposes by both sides, they will certainly cause massive destruction. Thus, there 
is no victory in nuclear warfare and no one would win or gain from war.  
                                                 
15 Joseph Bermudez and W. Seth Carus, “Iran's Growing Missile Forces,” Jane's Defence Weekly, July 
1988, 126,131; Joseph Bermudez, “Syria's Acquisition of North Korean ‘Scuds’,” Jane's Intelligence 
Review, June 1991. 
16 Arthur H. Westing, Cultural Norms, War and the Environment, (Oxford & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 163-179.  
17 For details, see FM 100-5, Operations (United States: Department of the Army, June 1993). 
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These days, the standard unit of general explosive power of nuclear bombs is the 
megaton. In the past, all warheads the U.S. and Soviet Union possessed had at least one 
megaton in explosive power. Megaton means a million tons and one megaton in 
explosive power is equivalent to the explosive power of a million tons of TNT, which is 
able to scorch any city within a 6.5 km radius. During the Korean War, the entire amount 
of bombs the U.S. dropped in the Korean Peninsula was 0.47 million tons, which is less 
than the explosive power of just one nuclear bomb at present.18 If North Korea succeeds 
in manufacturing nuclear weapons, the explosive power of possible nuclear bombs would 
be 20 Kt or so—that is similar to one of nuclear bombs dropped in Nagasaki. Nuclear 
weapons physically destroy all humans and property and explode successively with three 
stages. The explosion of one megaton of nuclear weapons causes an enormous pillar of 
fire with approximately an 800m diameter. The temperature of the pillar of fire reaches 
20,000°C, which can melt and burn everything within several kilometers.19 The first 
destructive effect of the one megaton nuclear bomb is to melt and burn everything in this 
horrific fire pillar. This fire pillar is instantly ignited and absorbs all air including oxygen 
at the igniting point. As a result, a vacuum is formed around the pillar. This suddenly 
formed vacuum absorbs all the air, causing a heat storm and heading to ground zero 
where nuclear bombs are detonated. Remaining people and unmelted buildings or things 
after the first hideous fire are demolished through this heat storm. Under such 
circumstances, all storms around ground zero soar to the sky. Nuclear bombs dropped in 
Hiroshima caused a mushroom cloud more than 10 km high. Inside a mushroom cloud, 
there is a lot of sand and dust, and irradiated things gradually fall down to the ground. 
Such fallout inflicts the survivors with radioactivity. This is the third damage of nuclear 
bomb explosion. Ultimately, all-out nuclear war makes survivors envy the dead, and the 
city hit by nuclear attack cannot return to life for the time being.  
Possession of nuclear weapons with such destructive power greatly affects 
international relations. Nuclear states have strategic advantage over non-nuclear states, 
                                                 
18 Samuel B. Payne, Jr., The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare (London: 
Blackwell, 1989). 
19 Wm. Robert Johnston, “On fire effects of nuclear weapons and military planning,” January 31, 
2004, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/opinion/opinion2004-01 (accessed April 23, 2007).  
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provided that such nuclear power cannot be offset with other warfare. Let's assume that a 
country possesses a nuclear weapon which can destroy its rival's capital with a single 
strike. In this case, the nuclear state has an absolute upper hand on any kinds of conflicts 
or negotiations. Non-nuclear states cannot trust the goodwill of nuclear states, so they 
cannot help but take all blackmails from nuclear states. Unlike conventional weapons, 
nuclear weapons are not developed for use in a real war but for threat or blackmail. If it 
works, it partly did its own job. The way to offset this threat is for the counterpart also to 
retain nuclear weapons. International politics explain such circumstances based on 
deterrence theory20 and proliferation theory: the greater the number of nuclear states, the 
higher the probability of nuclear war.  
2. Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Theory 
a. Proliferation Optimist: Deterrence Theory 
An apparent contradiction lies at the center of our understanding about 
nuclear weapons and deterrence. On the one hand, it is widely believed that nuclear 
weapons were an important factor in maintaining the perpetual peace between the United 
States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The two superpowers avoided war 
despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises, and a prolonged arms race. Then how 
does deterrence work under ideal conditions? Generally, successful deterrence requires 
three components: capability, communication, and credibility. First, the party fearing 
nuclear attack must have the capability to retaliate with nuclear weapons against an 
attacker. Second, retaliation must be clearly communicated to the adversary by a 
trustworthy source. Third, the potential aggressor must understand that the first two 
elements exist and are credible.21  
                                                 
20 An equality (nuclear proliferation=higher chance of nuclear war) is the overwhelmingly supported 
view among scholars who study whether nuclear proliferation would influence international politics and 
politicians of existing nuclear states. This logic is like that if “n+1 states” went nuclear, the world would be 
more unstable than if “n states” went nuclear. Therefore, existing nuclear states claim that a such situation 
should be prevented. As a representative scholar, Kenneth N. Waltz argued that war was caused by unclear 
evaluation of an enemy’s capacity, so by possessing nuclear weapons, military capacity is clearly assessed. 
Scholar Morton A. Kaplan assumed the “Unit Veto System,” in which nuclear proliferation is completed to 
some degree that any states can deny other states’ intention, whereby war can be deterred. 
21 Mario E. Carranza, “An Impossible Game: Stable Nuclear Deterrence after the Indian and Pakistani 
Tests,” The Nonproliferation Review (Spring/Summer 1989), 16. 
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Capability requires the ability to punish the aggressor to such a degree as 
to not risk further provocation. Waltz argues that this condition has been facilitated by the 
increase of nuclear weapons, though small arsenals are also effective as a war deterrent.22 
Proliferation optimists point to the lack of nuclear war as proof of this concept. This 
concept has made many believe that the mission of the military in the nuclear age has 
changed from winning wars to preventing wars.23  
Communication made by a reliable or authorized source is the second 
component of deterrence. For deterrence to work properly, it is important to communicate 
capability and resolve to adversaries. Communication of the threat can be lost in a crisis 
due to competing signals and information overload.24 The final component of deterrence 
is credibility that the threat is real. This is the most complex of the three components. It is 
based upon the existence of both capability and a communicated threat. A nuclear 
response must appear to be credible, not a bluff.25  
Fundamental data for the policy-making process by political leaders is 
proven war performance ability. If leaders think that the first strike could lead to victory, 
nuclear weapons cannot act as a war deterrent, in spite of the greatness of the 
counterpart's war performance. Likewise, if some leaders believe that the first strike 
could neutralize the second retaliatory strike, the deterrence theory would not be effective 
at all. The reason that war deterrence was effective between the U.S. and USSR was that 
neither had the first strike capability to neutralize its counterpart. However, the U.S. and 
USSR both had the capability of a retaliatory strike after the counterpart's first strike.  
 
                                                 
22 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: 
W. W. Norton and Company, 1995). 
23 Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and 
World Order, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1946), 76. 
24 Richard Ned Lebow, “Conclusions,” Psychology and Deterrence, ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned 
Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1985), 205-211. 
25 David W. Tarr, Nuclear Deterrence and International Security: Alternative Nuclear Regimes (New 
York, Longman, 1991), 68-69. 
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If the U.S. and USSR had only possessed conventional weapons at the 
moment of the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the world would have experienced World War 
III. We should acknowledge that the existence of nuclear weapons contributed to the 
prevention of World War III between the U.S. and Soviet Union. 
In this context, John Mearsheimer believes that “nuclear weapons are a 
superb deterrent” and argues that both Germany and Ukraine should be encouraged to 
become nuclear powers in the post-Cold War era.26 Stephen Ban Evera also calls for 
German acquisition of a nuclear arsenal to deter Russia, and Barry Posen recommends 
that Ukraine should keep nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russian military 
intervention.27 Shai Feldman argues that nuclear proliferation in the Middle East could 
stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict.28 Waltz even maintains that “the probability of major 
war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.”29 If this is true, then the 
spread of nuclear weapons should have positive consequences, and the possession of 
nuclear weapons should reduce the likelihood of war because it makes the costs of war so 
great.  
b. Proliferation Pessimist 
Such optimistic views of the effects of nuclear proliferation have criticism, 
of course, and a number of scholars have argued that nuclear deterrence may not be stable  
 
 
                                                 
26 John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International 
Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), 5-56; Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), 50-66. 
27 Stephen Ban Evera, “Primed For Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 
15, no. 3 (Winter 1990/91), 54; Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, 
vol. 35, no. 11 (Spring 1993), 44-45.  
28 Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 142-175. 
29 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” eds., Robert I. Rotberg and 
Theodore K. Rabb, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 50-51. 
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in specific regional settings.30 Most notably, the deterrence theory is based on the 
assumption that all policy makers are so rational and reasonable that they can judge the 
situation and the enemy's military power rightly.  
In addition to the assumption that states behave in a basically rational 
manner, pursuing their interests according to the expected utility theory, another realistic 
set of assumptions views government leaders as intending to behave rationally, yet 
envisions their beliefs, the options available to them, and the final implementation of 
their decisions as being influenced by powerful organizational actors. If this is the case, 
organization theory should be useful to aid the understanding of the consequences of 
proliferation as well.  
Two widespread themes in the organization theory focus on the major 
impediments to pure rationality in organizational behavior. First, large organizations 
function within a severely “bounded” form of rationality; they have inherent limits on 
calculation and coordination and use simplifying mechanisms to understand and respond 
to uncertainty in the external environment.31 As James March and Herbert Simon put it, 
“the world tends to be perceived by the organization members in terms of the particular 
concepts that are reflected in the organization’s vocabulary. The particular categories it 
employs are reified, and become, for members of the organization, attributes of the world 
rather than more conventions.”32 
Second, most complex organizations have multiple conflicting goals, and 
the process by which objectives are chosen and pursued is intensely political. Such a 
political perspective views apparently irrational behaviors as serving the narrow interests 
of some units within the organization, even if the decisions are absolutely stupid from the 
leadership’s overall perspective.33  
                                                 
30 Karl Kaiser, “Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Deterrence,” Survival, vol. 31, no. 2 (March/April 
1989), 123-136. 
31 Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models,” American Political 
Science Review, vol. 86, no. 2 (June 1992), 301-322. 
32 March and Simon, Organization, 165. 
33 Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, “Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 2 (June 1981), 174. 
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We do not know about the likely influence of the structure and biases of 
military organizations on the prevention of unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons. It is 
harder to predict how decision makers in North Korea, one of the most isolated states in 
the world, effect the prevention of accidental uses of nuclear weapons.  
Going back to the Cold War era, if the USSR could not destroy a U.S. 
submarine with a single strike, it would be demolished with a U.S. second retaliatory 
strike. Then could such a nuclear deterrent be effective to North Korea as it was between 
the U.S. and USSR? When small rival states possess nuclear weapons, can these weapons 
be effective as a deterrent between them? We cannot answer this question based on 
experience because there are no parallels involving small states.  
There have been no official small rival nuclear states such as inter-Korea 
in history. Though North Korea proclaimed its possession of nuclear weapons in 2006, 
North and South Korea are not officially nuclear states as of yet. Therefore, deterrence 
among small states has only been considered based on logical analogy. First, if one small 
state possessed nuclear weapons, it would have absolute advantage over rival states by 
threatening them with its nuclear power. The non-nuclear states would have to choose 
whether to take the nuclear strike or surrender. Under such circumstances, it is not an 
exaggeration to say that North Korea's nuclear possession would be fatal to South Korea's 
peace and security. Thus, South Korea has no other choice but to obtain nuclear weapons 
to counter North Korea.  
Assume that states in trouble go nuclear. Suppose two states with a 
population of 70 million and a size of 200,000 km2 have ten nuclear warheads and 
delivery missiles. Moreover, the nations are adjacent with a two to three minute flight 
time. If they were in a serious situation, what would happen? Due to the fact that both 
leaders would be well aware of the result of nuclear war, they would try to avoid war 
unless they were insane. In other words, it is possible that the deterrence that was 
effective between the U.S. and USSR could be effective among minor powers.  
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When two small and weak states have nuclear weapons and are in trouble, 
there exists the critical view that it could lead to nuclear war.34 The view is that because 
both states are small, the first hit would be fatal. It would be almost impossible to launch 
second retaliatory strike missiles after realizing the enemy's launch of nuclear missiles. In 
consequence, crises and conflicts among small and weak states would be likely to cause 
an obsession or seduction of preemptive strike. Therefore, it would deteriorate the 
stability of international relations. As said, in effect, there could be higher likelihood of 
nuclear war. It is certain that we cannot expect certain deterrence among closely located 
states. In particular, given the level of science technology concerning construction of 
arms system, nuclear bombs of minor powers are more likely to cause accidental wars 
rather than prevent wars.  
c. Minor Powers’ Dilemma in Pursuit of Nuclear Possession 
The U.S.-Soviet deterrence framework rested on the existence of two 
huge, dispersed nuclear arsenals. If the USSR missed just one U.S. submarine with a first 
strike, it would be demolished by the inevitable U.S. second strike. Can the smaller 
nuclear arsenals of small rival states act as an effective deterrent between them? We 
cannot answer this question based on experience because there are no parallels among 
small states. Israel’s rivals in the Middle East do not have nuclear weapons, and nuclear 
possession by both India and Pakistan is not yet formalized by the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. 
North Korea proclaimed its possession of nuclear weapons only in 2006, 
so there has been little time to determine what impact this might have on South Korea 
and neighboring countries. Therefore, deterrence among small states can only be 
considered on the basis of logical analogy. First, if one small state possesses nuclear 
weapons, it would have absolute advantage over rival states by threatening them with 
nuclear weapons. If the state’s despotic leader had a decisive say for the nuclear use, it 
would be a great threat to neighboring non-nuclear states. Thus, North Korea's nuclear 
                                                 
34 Donald M. Snow, The Shadow of the Mushroom Shaped Cloud (Columbus Ohio: The Ohio State 
University, 1978), 23. 
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possession could be detrimental to the security of South Korea and Japan. In turn, South 
Korea or Japan would feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to offset the threat from 
North Korea. This virtual situation would mean the failure of the U.S. policy objective to 
maintain a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. In summary, it would be very difficult for a 
damaged adjacent minor state to conduct a retaliatory strike following a nuclear attack. In 
the case that one or more of the states in question was especially untrustworthy or non-
democratic, we cannot ignore the possibility that the possession of nuclear weapons by 
neighboring minor powers would be especially destabilizing. Since neither state could 
pose a legitimate capacity to conduct a retaliatory strike, the probability of any state 
conducting a first strike simply on the basis of self-defense would increase. 
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III. NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR POLICY  
A. EVOLUTION OF NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
The North Korean regime sees the U.S. as its most significant threat and considers 
nuclear capability essential to deter a U.S. attack. It claims the threat of a U.S. attack 
justifies its weapons development programs and views the Bush administration’s hawkish 
comments and reluctance to sign a nonaggression pact as indicators that U.S. military 
action may be imminent. Some academics argue that North Korea’s poor financial straits, 
lack of allies, and diplomatic isolation lead it to see a nuclear capability as “the only way 
to guarantee the regime’s survival.”35 They suggest that in addition to providing a 
deterrent, nuclear capability provides a bargaining chip, which can be manipulated to win 
humanitarian and economic aid. In light of North Korea’s ongoing economic and 
agricultural crises, its nuclear weapons program could be viewed as an attempt to develop 
an asset other countries would view as worth trading for increased economic and food 
aid. North Korean statements appear to confirm this perspective. North Korea claimed its 
detonation of a nuclear warhead on September 9, 2006 was intended to urge the United 
States back to the negotiating table, indicating that Kim Jong-il is trying to leverage one 
of his few advantages.   
The DPRK’s nuclear program began after the “Russo-DPRK accord on peaceful 
use of nuclear”(March 1956) was signed. At that time, North Korea signed an accord 
with the Soviet Union and arranged the legal ground to be supported by nuclear 
technology from the USSR. In addition, North Korea dispatched dozens of nuclear 
scientists to the “Duvena nuclear institute” for technical training. After that, North Korea 
introduced IRT-2000, a small reactor for study purposes, which it obtained from the 
USSR in 1962 in order to set up an infrastructure for developing nuclear technology; 
North Korea also established a nuclear laboratory in Younbyun, 100 miles north of 
                                                 
35 Victor Cha, “Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula,” International 
Security, vol. 27, no. 1, 42. 
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Pyongyang, in 1964.36 Pyongyang’s initial decision to develop a nuclear bomb came 
from a Kim Il-sung directive, probably in the 1960s.37 At this time, North Korea is 
estimated to be interested in the development of nuclear weapons along with the nuclear 
energy. 
North Korea entered into the IAEA in September 1974 and formed the “Partial 
Nuclear Safety Measure Treaty.” With this effort, the DPRK intensively tried to 
introduce the nuclear plant through bargaining with Japan, France during the 1970s, and 
Germany during the 1980s. At this time, South Korea gave an impetus to building 
military forces and defense industry to narrow the gap of military power with North 
Korea. With the United States being defeated in the Vietnam War and the Carter 
administration withdrawing the United States forces, South Korea pursued nuclear 
development in the mid-1970s for the purpose of security. As the United States prevented 
France from exporting its reprocessing facility in 1977, the nuclear project of South 
Korea was perpetually suspended. It is speculated that North Korea was stimulated to 
develop its nuclear project in response to the efforts of South Korea.  
In 1985, Pyongyang signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but in 
1989 Yongbyon's main research and plutonium production reactor was shut down for 
approximately 100 days, which signaled refueling and extraction of weapons grade 
plutonium.38 Without IAEA inspectors in place to verify the propriety of this shutdown, 
U.S. intelligence was left to speculate about plausible scenarios; 100 days provided 
adequate time to completely refuel the reactor and extract the necessary materials to 
produce nuclear weapons.  
In 1992, North Korea signed a nuclear safeguards agreement introducing 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. It appeared that North Korea 
was finally offering access to the small amount of plutonium separated during their “one-
                                                 
36 For a description of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, see “North Korean WMD Facilities and 
Chronologies,” on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website, 
http://www.nti.org/e_research/e1_nkorea_profile.html (accessed January 23, 2007).   
37 Interview with North Korean defector by Daniel A. Pinkston, November 1, 2001, Seoul. 
38 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological, 
and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 284. 
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time plutonium extraction experiment.”39 The chemical analysis during inspection 
showed the DPRK conducted three to four plutonium separation experiments since 
1989.40 When the IAEA requested to visit and inspect waste sites, the DPRK refused, and 
by 12 March 1993, they withdrew from the NPT. Following negotiations with the U.S., 
Pyongyang rescinded its declaration of withdrawal from the NPT, but clarified it was no 
longer a full party to the NPT and severely restricted routine IAEA inspections.41 In 
1994, the DPRK issued a statement that it would defuel its 5-MWe reactor at Yongbyon, 
essentially signaling an overt declaration of reprocessing up to 30 kilograms of 
plutonium.42 The outcome of intense negotiations was the Agreed Framework (AF), 
under which the U.S. declared a non-hostile stance toward the DPRK. The DPRK 
received two light water reactors in exchange for a freeze on its nuclear weapons 
facilities and full compliance with its IAEA safeguard agreement.43 The AF created a 
loophole for Pyongyang to acquire uranium enrichment programs. 
As possible payment for DPRK support in the creation of Pakistan’s Ghari 1 
missile, AQ Khan, former director of the Khan Research Laboratory in Pakistan, 
provided the DPRK with technology, old and discarded centrifuge and enrichment 
machines, and depleted uranium hexafluoride.44 George Tenet, former CIA director, 
stated to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “We . . . believe Pyongyang is 
pursuing a production-scale uranium enrichment program based on technology provided 
by AQ Khan, which would give the DPRK an alternative route to nuclear weapons.”45  
                                                 
39 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological, 
and Chemical Threats (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 285. 
40 Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley, “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Nuclear Control Institute, 
June 16, 1994, http://www.nci.org/n/nkib1.htm (accessed March 15, 2007). 
41 Cirincione, 286. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 287. 
44 Christopher Oren Clary, “The A. Q. Khan Network [electronic resource]: Causes and Implications” 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Dec%5FClary.pdf (accessed February 20, 2007). 
45 “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade between North Korea and Pakistan,” Congressional 
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In 2002, the DPRK reinvigorated its plutonium program at Yongbyon, and the 
U.S. stopped all programs outlined in the AF.46 First Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok 
Ju admitted to James Kelly, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
affairs, that the DPRK possessed a uranium enrichment facility.47 Although the 
admission came under severe scrutiny, it is still possible that Kang “slipped up” in 
revealing their position. Finally, in January 2003, the DPRK announced their withdrawal 
from the NPT and expelled the IAEA inspectors. They continued to claim their peaceful 
nuclear intentions, even offering “separate verification” of their nuclear program, an offer 
they would later recant.48  
In February 2005, the DPRK admitted it possessed nuclear weapons.49 The 
ambiguity of the situation remained for 18 months until October 9, 2006, when it 
conducted an underground test of a small nuclear device. Pyongyang has not allowed 
physical inspection of the detonation site, but the U.S. detected radioactive materials in 
the air around North Korea some days later.50 
Since August of 2003, the U.S., China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia along with 
North Korea have participated in six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean 
Peninsula. Although the talks began in August 2003, they were stalemated until 
September 2005, when the six parties produced a statement of principles. Then, the talks 
deadlocked again as North Korea and the U.S. provided very different interpretations of 
the six-party statement; North Korea announced its second major boycott of the talks in 
November 2005.  
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47 Ibid. 
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In February 2007, the participants in the six-party talks announced that North 
Korea agreed to a set of initial actions to achieve denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula. North Korea committed to allowing IAEA inspectors to return to assist with 
shutting down the Yongbyon nuclear facility. In return, the other parties agreed to 
provide emergency energy assistance and enable North Korea’s access to previously 
blocked foreign bank accounts.51  
B. NORTH KOREAN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH 
To understand North Korea’s rationale for developing a nuclear capability, it is 
important to succinctly address North Korea’s conventional military strength. Since the 
Korean War armistice, North Korea has maintained a bellicose posture that can best be 
judged by comparison against South Korean forces. The table below shows that South 
Korean vs. North Korean military strength in manpower and materials seems to favor 
North Korea.  
 
Table 1.   South Korean vs. North Korean military strength52 
 
Country South Korea North Korea 
Yearly Military Expenditures $21,060,000,000 $5,217,400,000 
Available Military Manpower 12,458,257 5,851,801 
Total Military Personnel 5,209,000 5,995,000 
Active Frontline Personnel 687,000 1,106,000 
Aircraft 1,481 1,624 
Armor 4,650 6,560 
Artillery 5,528 21,400 
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Country South Korea North Korea 
Missile Defense Systems 7,032 16,075 
Navy Units 85 708 
Major Ports 5 11 
Oil Consumption 2,168,000 (bbl per day) 25,000 (bbl per day) 
Arms Exports $14,000,000 $NR 
Arms Imports $103,000,000 $NR 
Land Area 98,480 sq km 120,540 sq km 
Airports 108 79 
Labor Force 23,530,000 9,600,000 
Purchasing Power  $956,300,000,000 $40,000,000,000 
bbl = barrel of oil (1 bbl = 42 U.S. gallons or 159 liters)  
 
This data, however, does not tell the entire story. North Korea has an active 1.1 
million soldier army, which is primarily poised along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that 
runs along the 38th parallel.53 The North Korean artillery pieces number in the thousands 
with many of them aimed at Seoul, just a few miles south of the DMZ. South Korea also 
has a capable standing military, but it is much smaller than North Korea’s. South Korea's 
forces are augmented by a small number of U.S. troops in and around the DMZ, which 
would slow an attack until reinforcements arrive. This balance of power has remained 
virtually unchanged since 1953.  
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union provided North Korea with advanced 
weaponry. In the 1980s, North Korea's Soviet-provided fighter aircraft such as Mig-29s 
and front-line tanks presented a substantial threat to South Korea.54 At the same time, 
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North Korea continued to develop long-range missiles and embarked on the nuclear 
program that has the world concerned to this day. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
fortunes of the North Korean military declined rapidly. Soviet technicians no longer 
repaired Soviet weapons systems; spare parts became nonexistent, and military readiness 
declined because of a series of floods and subsequent poor crop yields that caused mass 
starvation of the North Korean population. While the regime supplied the military first 
for everything including food, the loss of Soviet support was felt in the armed forces. 
While still a powerful military force, North Korea is now severely weakened and 
vulnerable.55 
Viewed in this light, pursuing nuclear weapons in support of a deterrent strategy 
against the U.S. makes sense. Goldstein argues, “Although developing, deploying, and 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal is neither cheap nor easy in an absolute sense, against an 
adversary whose capabilities one cannot match, nuclear weapons married to a deterrent 
strategy promise greater security than that provided by comparable spending on 
conventional forces married to a defensive strategy.”56 Nuclear weapons provide an 
economically efficient deterrent. 
C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
North Korea is a closed state with a communist dictatorial government in 
complete control. It's a country isolated from the realities of the world community, led by 
a regime desperate to stay relevant to its people. “The North Korean regime and its 
practices are an anathema to nearly every civilized value. The starving of children; the 
relative deprivation that forces farmers to sell their daughters for Chinese cattle; the 
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physical handicaps that a generation of youth will bear due to a basic lack of nutrition and 
medicine all occur while the political regime and military survive in relative splendor.”57 
How did things go wrong for North Korea? Following the Soviet model, Kim 
established complete control of all aspects of the country to include instituting a 
command economy and nationalizing large percentages of indigenous North Korean 
industry. This allowed the Korean Worker's Party to control all of the country’s 
manufacturing for both export and internal consumption. All aspects of the economy 
from money flow to infrastructure upgrades and improvements were carried out only by 
the state. Agriculture followed the communist policy as well. Land was seized and 
redistributed to the peasant classes, and the command economy dictated production 
requirements. Following the examples of China and the Soviet Union, collectivization 
was instituted in the 1950s, and by 1960, almost all agricultural production had reverted 
to collectivization.  
North Korea followed the communist theory of diverting all available resources 
into heavy industries; military production became one of its highest priorities. Consumer 
goods were neglected in deference to the state. North Korea’s command economy paid 
workers a low fixed rate for wages and products and used the surplus to finance its 
industrialization effort.58 The results of this industrialization increased the living standard 
of its population up through the early 1960s.59 By the late 1960s however, the North 
Korean economy was beginning to become sluggish. The difference in income 
distribution between rural and urban areas became greater because of stagnation in the 
production of agriculture. North Korea’s continued massive spending on military 
procurement and crumbling existing infrastructure led to economic stagnation and 
increasing debt.  
                                                 
57 Elizabeth Rosenthal, “In North Korean Hunger, Legacy is Stunned Children,” New York Times, 
December 16, 1998. 
58 U.S. Library of Congress, North Korea: A Country Study, http://countrystudies.us/north-
korea/2.htm (accessed September 6, 2006). 
59 J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Comparative Economics in a Transforming World Economy, 2nd edition, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2004, 517-520. 
 27
North Korea’s philosophy of self-reliance and its resistance to foreign interference 
compounded its problems. The guiding philosophy of the North Korean state is called 
“Juche.” What is Juche? The 1998 revised version of the DPRK’s constitution, which 
reinforced Juche, stated unequivocally in Article 20 that “the means of production are 
owned solely by the State and co-operative organizations.”60 Juche is an original theory 
by Kim Il-song, the Soviet-installed father of modern North Korea. This theory maintains 
that North Korea will move to economic independence without the help of foreigners. 
Kim skillfully combined Confucian tradition, Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism to form 
his Juche philosophy, and applied these revolutionary ideas to Korean social structures to 
form the economic and military philosophy to guide his country.61 
By the 1970s, North Korea’s economy had declined and was no longer able to 
produce enough to support the floundering North Korean economy. Capitalist areas of the 
world were outstripping command economies by moving into advanced stages of 
industry, moving away from heavy coal burning industries. Countries such as South 
Korea were reaping the benefits of an aggressive market economy. South Korea’s 
economic prosperity led to the formation of a stable democratic government with an 
emerging capitalist market-driven economy, in stark contrast to North Korea. By the mid-
1970s, South Korean economic reforms led progressively to its passing North Korea 
economically and militarily.62 
Trade certainly has a positive impact on the North Korean economy, but the 
extent is difficult to determine because it is a closed system, and North Korea does not 
report its numbers. Additionally, South Korean reporting is inconsistent because it views 
its dealings with North Korea as inter-Korean trade and does not report its interactions as 
foreign trade.63 North Korea also engages in illegal arms sales, drug trafficking, and  
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narcotics, which provide a stream of hard currency income that is difficult to trace. Yet 
another source of income comes from its diasporas living in other countries, including the 
Chosen Soren group living in Japan.64 
North Korea and its leader Kim Il-sung found it difficult to respond to South 
Korean prosperity and became increasingly alarmed that this well-armed economic giant 
undermined the legitimacy of the North Korean leadership. Kim realized that he had to 
do something. In China, Deng Xiaoping was instituting reforms by opening China to 
foreign investment and instituting a dual track economic system, but because of Kim’s 
Juche philosophy, he did not follow the Chinese model. Kim opted instead to increase his 
country's reliance on Juche. This exacerbated North Korea’s isolation from the world, 
discouraging investment and preventing needed technological upgrades to its faltering 
industrial and agricultural sectors. By 1980, North Korea had defaulted on all of its 
foreign loans, and by 2000, its industrial output was in a perpetual decline. 
Today the North Korean economy is described as “the possibility of Perestroika, 
the impossibility of Glasnost.”65 This means that North Korean leadership, out of 
desperation, has explored the process of economic liberalization without any hint of 
political liberalization. This seems to imitate China’s initiatives in the 1990s to open a 
dual track economy. Deng Xiaoping decided to open China economically, by slowly 
allowing foreign direct investment first while maintaining a state-controlled command 
economy. Gradually other sectors of the economy were opened, allowing market 
pressures to change the economy without the economic and social upheavals that 
occurred with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The result has been a steady economic 
transformation of the Chinese economy without any significant changes to the political 
reality in China.66 This appears to be the model that North Korea is trying to pursue. 
Granted, North Korea has not instituted the reforms that the Chinese have, and this has 
led to some serious economic problems for this isolated country.  
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Even though North Korea has looked at the Chinese example, its economy is 
structured like that of the former Soviet Union. In China, only about 20% of the 
population was working in the industrialized sectors when Deng began his reforms. In 
North Korea, over 90% of the work force is engaged in highly industrialized state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). While China could make economic reforms and affect only 20% of 
its population, major reforms in North Korea would affect the social benefits of over 90% 
of its workers; this puts North Korea in a precarious position, much like that of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.67 Another crucial difference 
between North Korea and China is their valuation of Foreign Direct Investment(FDI). 
Because of North Korea’s Juche philosophy, the FDI has been viewed as unnecessary. In 
fact, in 1980 Kim Il-sung declared, “North Korea is a self-sufficient socialist economy 
with no need for foreign capital.”68 China’s reform required massive amounts of foreign 
investment, while North Korea has experienced very little direct investment from abroad. 
Even potential investment was stifled by the regime’s habit of defaulting on foreign debts 
and its propensity to put rigid controls on any foreign endeavor in North Korea. Kim 
Jong-il has begun to realize that foreign investment is essential to improving the 
economy, but the track record of the regime leads to caution and hesitance from potential 
investors.  
North Korea seems unable to rid itself of its Juche philosophy. This is slowly 
strangling the country, placing it in a desperate economic situation. The leadership 
recognizes that a liberalization of the economy is necessary, but this is not as easy as it 
may seem. To adopt economic openness would be like admitting that Kim Il-sung and his 
philosophy of Juche were wrong. This poses a tremendous challenge in today’s North 
Korea. Kim Il-sung is the god of the North Korean people. Unlike Mao and Stalin in 
China and the former Soviet Union, Kim Il-sung is forever the savior of the North Korean 
people. Mao and Stalin were seen as great leaders but they were never looked upon as 
gods. In fact, their successors blamed them for failed economic policies and used this as  
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an excuse to pursue other economic paths. In North Korea, Kim Il-sung is the foundation 
of the state. He is the president forever for the DPRK and Kim Jong-il’s legitimacy is 
based on his father’s legacy and continued worship within the country.  
Kim Il-sung’s ancestors are revered revolutionaries, dating back to the 1800s. 
North Korean propagandists claim the entire family to be of noble birth. This propaganda 
machine fabricates every aspect of North Korean society. Children learn stories of the 
Kim family’s exploits; they are taught that North Korea could not exist without the 
guidance of Kim Il-sung and his family. The people believe that while their lives are 
desperate, they live in the only functioning society in the world. To change economic 
philosophies from Juche would admit that the “The Great Father” was wrong. This is not 
something the current North Korean regime could consider. “Even if a serious reform 
program were attempted, it is by no means preordained that such a program would be 
successful. The three robust predictors of success in reforming centrally planned 
economies are the degree of macroeconomic stability at the time that reform is initiated; 
the legacy of a functional pre-socialist commercial legal system; and the size of the 
agricultural sector.”69 
The North Korean people suffer a continuing deterioration of living standards. 
The results of the communist dictatorship and its ruinous policies of self-determination 
and isolation have made North Korea one of the poorest and most backward countries on 
earth. The gap between the living standards of the citizens of North Korea and the South 
is immeasurable. A comparison of the two German nations prior to reunification is not 
analogous to the Korean situation. Such a wide gap in socioeconomic status would ensure 
difficulty in any future unification of the Korean Peninsula. This highlights the belief that 
economic engagement could lessen the shock of a future reunification of the Korean 
people. 
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D. MOTIVATIONS FOR DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
In October 2002, when United States Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly 
visited Pyongyang to discuss a number of important issues with North Korea and 
presented evidence of a North Korean program to enrich uranium, North Korean First 
Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu acknowledged the existence of the program after 
initially denying the accusations.70 Considering that developing and producing nuclear 
weapons take time, especially for developing countries like North Korea, it is necessary 
to go back to the starting point of the dispute to find a solution to the North Korean 
nuclear impasse. More specifically, it is important to delve into the North Koreans’ threat 
perceptions over the past half century to clearly understand their motivations for 
acquiring the nuclear bomb.  
The North Korean leadership’s political decision to seek nuclear weapons was not 
made from nothing. North Korean nuclear development started from a deeper rationale. 
Basically, North Korea faces a number of external and internal security problems. Korea 
is surrounded by major powers, and the peninsula has been subject to numerous invasions 
over past centuries. Notably, Japanese invasion in 1552 and 1597 still has 
psychologically lingering effects on the Korean people, even though it occurred centuries 
ago. A number of historical, internal, and external factors during the 20th century have 
been rooted deep inside of the North Korean ruling elite and their supporters. A strong 
military posture and nuclear weapons systems not only help the leadership deal with 
external threats, but they are also popular among nationalistic people who are constantly 
reminded of the potential external threats to North Korea.  
1. Historical Motivation 
Even though U.S. military forces have been stationed in South Korea since the 
end of the Korean War to deter another North Korean invasion across the 38th parallel 
like the one on 25 June 1950, all North Koreans are taught that the United States invaded 
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the North on that day, and that Kim Il-sung repelled the American invasion during the 
“Fatherland Liberation War.”71 The North Korean media has provided extensive 
propaganda of U.S. military intervention since 1950 and of the need to remain 
ideologically awake against the possibility of “another American attack.”72  
Despite Pyongyang’s historical revisionism, such fixed ideas provide North 
Korean leaders with the motivation to acquire a capability to strike U.S. targets, in order 
to deter American military intervention with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 
North Korean leaders are well aware that conventional weapons cannot deter U.S. 
military intervention. In addition, during the Korean War, Pyongyang was severely 
threatened by U.S. nuclear weapons. More specifically, these threats included President 
Truman’s press conference on 30 November 1950, when he mentioned the possibility of 
using nuclear weapons to end the Korean War; General MacArthur’s request for 34 
atomic bombs to use in Korea and Manchuria; and statements by candidate and President 
Eisenhower about using nuclear weapons to end the Korean War.73 Because of this 
experience, North Korean leaders are highly motivated to develop nuclear weapons and 
long-range missiles.  
2. Internal Motivation 
Many analysts argue that inter-Korean rivalry has also motivated North Korea to 
acquire nuclear weapons. It is unclear how North Korea would use a nuclear bomb 
against South Korea, except for deterrence and/or coercive diplomacy, because North 
Korea would be well aware that attacking South Korea would lead directly to the end of 
the North Korean regime. From North Korea’s perspective, eliminating the South Korean 
government and reunifying the country on Pyongyang’s terms would certainly resolve  
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North Korea’s main security problem and attain the original objective. North Korea 
claims to be the sole legitimate government for all the Korean people and all of the 
territory on the Korean Peninsula.  
According to North Korea’s Socialist Constitution, “all state activities shall be 
conducted under the leadership of the Korean Worker's Party (KWP), and the North 
Korean state will complete the revolution based on “Juche”74 under the leadership of the 
KWP.” In its first chapter, the constitution also declares that the North Korean 
government represents the interests of all the Korean people.75 All North Korean 
government activities are guided by the KWP, which is also committed to revising the 
status quo on the Korean Peninsula. The KWP bylaws state that the party is to liberate all 
the people on the peninsula, complete the revolution, and establish communism and 
Juche ideology throughout all of Korean society. Furthermore, the KWP is to 
“continuously strengthen unification solidarity based on Juche ideology.76  
3. External Motivation 
After the Korean War in 1953, the potential nuclear conflict in Korea had not 
completely disappeared. There have been several incidents since the war that could have 
escalated into a nuclear conflict: the North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968, a 
North Korean commando raid on the South Korean presidential residence in 1968, the ax-
murders of two U.S. soldiers at Panmunjum in 1976, the assassination attempt against 
South Korean President Chun Tu Hwan in Burma in 1983, and the standoff over North 
Korea’s refusal to permit the completion of IAEA safeguards inspections in 1994. 
Given Pyongyang’s threat perception and security needs, North Korea has sought 
to strengthen its military capabilities by forming security alliances and by allocating a 
tremendous amount of resources to the military sector under the “Sungun” or military-
first policy adopted by Kim Jong-il. In this context, North Korea signed security alliances 
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with China and the Soviet Union, but North Korean leaders have been disappointed with 
their alliance partners on several occasions. For example, during the Korean War when 
China and the USSR provided assistance, Kim Il-sung, who wished to have more support 
than he received, was really dissatisfied that Stalin did not provide ground and air forces 
and other resources to repulse the American forces. As a result, U.S. forces succeeded in 
the Inchon landing operation and went up toward Pyongyang and even to the Imjin river. 
In December 1962, the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party adopted “four 
policy lines” as follows;  
• improve political and technical discipline in the military 
• modernize the military 
• arm all the people with “class conscientiousness” and military technology 
• fortify the whole country77  
One of the other factors that inherently shook Pyongyang’s previous dependence 
on alliance and changed its stance into a more nationalistic policy line was China's 
evolving normalization with other surrounding countries, which were once in hostile 
relations: the normalization of U.S.-China relations and the normalization of relations 
between Beijing and Seoul. The collapse of the USSR and the socialist countries in 
Eastern Europe and the normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul added to 
the shock. In sum, these events led North Korean leaders to question the credibility of 
their alliance partners, while all the more strengthening their Juche ideology and 
increasing Pyongyang’s perceived need to have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. 
Considering the situation in which North Korea develops its nuclear weapons 
program, coupled with the highly enriched uranium (HEU), some argue that Bush 
administration policies could have pressured North Korea into admitting its plutonium 
program, along with its HEU program in an effort to negotiate and to meet U.S. demands 
over its nuclear program. On the other hand, others argue that Bush administration 
policies could have encouraged North Korea to accelerate its program to acquire nuclear 
weapons through the HEU route. However, Pyongyang has undoubtedly expressed 
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concern about being included in George W. Bush’s “axis of evil,” and about the 
possibility of being subject to a “preemptive nuclear strike.”78 In this context, we can be 
well aware of how much North Korea was influenced by international components as 
well as domestic components. 
E. NUCLEAR CAPACITY 
1. Nuclear Technology  
a. Plutonium  
On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it conducted its first nuclear 
test. After several days of evaluation, U.S. authorities confirmed that the underground 
explosion was nuclear, but that the test produced a low yield of less than one kiloton. 
Most estimates place the blast’s yield between 0.2–1 kiloton.79 In early December 2006, 
intelligence sources indicated activities were underway at the Mount Mantap nuclear test 
site near the village of Punggye-ri in the North Hamgyong Province. The activities were 
first disclosed by South Korean National Assemblyman Chong Hyong Gun of the Grand 
National Party on December 21.80 Chong’s disclosure followed South Korean Defense 
Minister Kim Chang Su’s December 15 admonition to 130 senior military commanders 
“to be thoroughly prepared to counter the possibility of a second or third nuclear test by 
North Korea.”81 According to him, Pyongyang had prepared two tunnels under Mount 
Mantap, and the October 9, 2006, test was conducted in a tunnel on the eastern side of the 
mountain while recent activities have been at the western tunnel. Chong also stated that  
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the North Koreans were seen constructing a temporary building ten meters from the 
tunnel entrance, and it is very likely the North Koreans were preparing the tunnel for a 
nuclear test.82  
As for North Korea’s amount of nuclear materials, there are many guesses 
and estimates in the world. According to some estimates from U.S. sources, North Korea 
has reprocessed some fuel rods from the 5 MW reactor at Yonbyon, and separated 12 to 
14 kilograms of plutonium, which is enough for one or two bombs.83 In addition, there is 
an unconfirmed report saying that about 56 kilograms of plutonium was smuggled from 
Russia in the early 1990s.84 
The low yield of the October 9th test could indicate that North Korean 
scientists and engineers have the ability to control the yield of nuclear explosions, or that 
they are seeking to achieve this capability. But it is unclear to what degree North Korean 
scientists sophisticatedly weaponize their nuclear bombs, and it is not known whether 
they can mount them on their ballistic missiles. 
North Korean officials reportedly informed Beijing hours before the 
October 9th nuclear test that the target yield for the blast was four kilotons of TNT; Dr. 
Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, believes that 
North Korea tested a device with a simple design, but he does not rule out the possibility 
that the DPRK attempted to detonate a sophisticated device.85 On the other hand, Richard 
Garwin and Frank von Hippel feel that if the target yield was 4 kilotons, then North 
Korea was not testing a simple Nagasaki-type device, speculating that the test was related 
to missile warhead development. They noted that the Nagasaki bomb weighed about four  
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tons, and North Korean aircraft and missiles could not deliver such a device, so 
presumably the DPRK could be working on a device in the range of 500 to 1000 
kilograms which can be delivered by North Korean ballistic missiles.86  
Peter Hayes and Kang Jung Min concluded that the test was more of a 
failure than a success because the DPRK failed to demonstrate the capability to deliver a 
reliable nuclear weapon. Hayes and Kang believe Pyongyang was unable to “pole-vault 
into the ranks of nuclear weapons states” and that the DPRK likely will test again, but the 
timing will depend upon the U.S. response and the international political environment.87 
Hayes and Kang correctly emphasize that achieving criticality in the test was a significant 
achievement and they raise three additional possible technical successes: DPRK scientists 
and engineers could be confident in their ability to detonate larger devices and are 
concentrating on smaller and more sophisticated weapons; the test used a small amount 
of plutonium, which economized on a scarce resource, and the DPRK was able to limit 
the release of radioactive fallout from the test. 
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that there are no essential 
technical barriers for North Korea to build plutonium-use nuclear weapons. If North 
Korea has not done it yet, it could predictably make some nuclear weapons in a short 
time.  
b. Uranium 
The controversy surrounding North Korea’s “highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) program” began in mid-2002, when the United States obtained what it then 
considered to be convincing evidence that North Korea was pursuing such a program. A 
key piece of evidence was, apparently, Pyongyang’s purchase from Russia of 150 tons of 
aluminum tubes that the United States then believed were designed to serve as the 
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stationary outer casings of uranium enrichment centrifuges.88 At the time, Pyongyang had 
frozen its plutonium production program, pursuant to the “1994 Agreed Framework.”89 
Although North Korea denied making the admission, at an October 2002 bilateral 
meeting in Pyongyang the U.S. negotiators asserted that North Korean representatives 
had defiantly admitted pursuing such a program.90  
The following evidence has since come out: North Korea acquired 
aluminum tubes from Russia and obtained about 20 centrifuges, equipment for uranium 
enrichment, provided by the Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan in the mid- to late- 
1990s; in April 2003, Egyptian customs authorities seized 22 tons of aluminum tubes 
destined for China and transshipment to North Korea. What is funny is that the tubes 
were ordered by Mr. Yun Ho Jin, who had served as the North Korean ambassador to the 
IAEA in Vienna in the early 1990s for the North Korean firm Namchongang. In addition, 
European enrichment specialists have testified in German court proceedings that the 
tubes seized in Egypt had the precise specifications of tubes used for the outer casings of 
enrichment centrifuges.91  
In 2002, a CIA estimate provided to the U.S. Congress declared that North 
Korea was building an enrichment facility that would be able to produce enough 
“weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year as soon as mid-
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decade.”92 However, according to a U.S. intelligence estimate declassified in February 
2007, the degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium still remains 
unknown.93 
2. Delivery Method 
On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a TaepoDong 1 from the Musudan-ri 
launch facility in North Hamgyonh Province, located on the northeast coast of North 
Korea. Before this event, very little was known about the North Korean ballistic missile 
program. Initial U.S. intelligence reports postulated that the TaepoDong 1 missile was 
only a two-stage rocket. The first stage fell into international waters 300 km east of 
Musudan-ri and the second stage flew over the Japanese island of Honshu and fell into 
the water 330 km away from the Japanese port of Hachinohe for a total distance of 
approximately 1,646 km.94 Further analysis of radar tapes revealed that the TaepoDong 1 
had a small third solid propellant stage.95 Debris from this third stage was believed to 
have impacted as far as 4,000 km from the launch point.96 In June 2006, the TaepoDong 
2 was observed being assembled and fueled at the Musudan-ri test site along the northeast 
coast of North Korea. On July 4, 2006, North Korea launched the TaepoDong 2, which 
was proceeded by three shorter-range ballistic missile launches. 
The North Korean TaepoDong program traces its origins to the No Dong 
medium-range ballistic missile program of the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, North 
Korea initiated the development of two ballistic missile programs known to the West as 
TaepoDong 1 and TaepoDong 2.97 The supposed design objectives for the TaepoDong 1 
system were to deliver a 1,000 to 1,500 kg warhead to a range of 1,500 to 2,500 km and 
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for the TaepoDong 2 to deliver the same warhead to a 4,000 to 8,000 km range.98 Some 
analysts further believe that the TaepoDong 2 could deliver a 700 to 1,000 kg payload as 
far as 6,700 km. 
The Washington Times indicated that North Korea is in the process of developing 
and deploying at least two new intermediate range ballistic missile systems.99 The two 
new missiles are believed to be based on the decommissioned Soviet R-27 submarine-
launched ballistic missile. The R-27 was allegedly acquired from Russia in the 1990s and 
possibly enhanced with the help of Russian missile specialists.100 Its forty-year-old, 
liquid-fuelled technology is considered within the technological and industrial 
capabilities of North Korea, and versions of its engines are already used in North Korean 
SCUDs and NoDong missiles.  
The new missiles, if they are indeed closely modified versions of the R-27, are 
likely more accurate and have greater range than North Korea’s previously shown 
missiles. Since North Korea is close in distance to South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. 
military bases in East Asia, these new missiles can be said to establish a deterrent force. 
North Korea does not have to produce an advanced, long-range missile for deterrence. 
Several plutonium-use bombs and short-range missiles which can reach South Korea and 
Japan are necessary conditions for deterrence. In this sense, as long as North Korea can 
minimize and load its nuclear weapons into a warhead, North Korea has no problem in 
delivering its nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence.  
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IV. IMPACT ON SURROUNDING STATES: RELEVANT STATES’ 
POSITIONS AND POLICIES 
A. THE UNITED STATES 
According to the Rand institute, the North Korean nuclear issue presumably will 
be the most critical security issue in Asia that the U.S. will face.101 This is not because it 
could be a direct threat to U.S. national security, but because it will have an enormous 
negative ripple effect on the security of Northeast Asia, along with the Middle East.  
North Korea’s attempt to acquire a nuclear deterrent risks the disruption of East 
Asia’s nuclear balance. A North Korean bomb could jeopardize long-term stability in the 
region by triggering the nuclear ambitions of Japan, South Korea, or even Taiwan. China 
already has three nuclear neighbors in Russia, India, and Pakistan. A regional nuclear 
arms race among existing non-nuclear neighbors could leave it surrounded. The 
disclosure in September 2004 of South Korea’s near bomb-grade uranium-enrichment 
experiment and plutonium-based nuclear research in the early 1980s heightened such 
concerns. Japan is widely believed to possess the capability to develop nuclear weapons 
quickly and easily if it chooses to do so. Reports in October 2004 show that Taiwan may 
have carried out plutonium-separation experiments in the mid-1980s.102 
Given these circumstances, the most fundamental U.S. goals of the confrontation 
with North Korea are to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and to prevent an attack—either nuclear or conventional—on the United States or on its 
allies in the Northeast Asia. Both actions would dramatically diminish U.S. security. The 
Bush administration, or the next probably democratic administration appears to be 
divided on how to best achieve these goals, with one group favoring negotiations to shape 
North Korea’s behavior and another group advocating measures that will contain and 
weaken the regime and ultimately likely to lead its collapse.  
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The options below provide alternatives in which elements of several strategies can 
be combined. 
1.  Expanding Engagement 
How can the United States prevent North Korea from supporting terrorism? 
Analysts who support engagement policy maintain that “America’s trade leadership can 
build a coalition of countries … Open markets are vital for developing nations, many of 
them fragile … that rely on the international economy to overcome poverty and create 
opportunity; we need to answer for those who ask for economic hope to counter internal 
threats to our common values.”103 
The analysts contend that economic reform allows an authoritarian regime to 
remain legitimate in the eyes of its people because it is seen as bringing increased 
prosperity to the country. Over time, however, the competitive pressure inherent in the 
liberalization of economies leads to increased convergence with capitalism.104 Reform 
and economic openness produce economic change without political liberalization in the 
short term but they also produce a reduction of societal resistance to reform, buying the 
existing regime time to implement politically difficult reforms and to reformulate the 
ideological foundation of their legitimacy to rule.105 North Korea’s Juche ideology could 
buy Kim Jong-il's regime more time to balance the pace of opening its market and 
political system, but ultimately economic openness will slowly move North Korea in a 
more positive direction by forces of the market.  
North Korea’s primary security concern is a military strike by the United States 
with the purpose of regime change. At the same time that South Korea extended offers of 
economic benefits and increased ties with North Korea, President Bush labeled North 
Korea a part of the “axis of evil.”106 For Kim Jong-il, continued existence has to take 
precedence over economic enticements. As long as the United States has troops on the 
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Korean territory and refuses to renounce the preemptive use of force as an option, North 
Korea will continue to view economic measures as secondary to the United States 
military threat. 
2.  Non-Military Containment 
U.S. estimates of the threat posed by the DPRK rose substantially after the 
September 11 attacks, and the mistrust generated by the unraveling of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework has further increased the difficulty of relying exclusively on diplomacy. 
Hawks in the Bush administration who tend to equate scrapping North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program with toppling Kim Jong-il’s regime have contemplated a more coercive 
approach toward North Korea.  
Applying pressure to obtain North Korean compliance has been a major 
component of the Bush administration's diplomatic strategy towards North Korea. 
Although North Korea has been under some form of U.S. sanctions since the Korean 
War, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13382 on June 29, 2005 to seize 
any U.S. assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters. The order named three North 
Korean entities and authorized executive agencies to expand the list of sanctioned entities 
if warranted.107 On October 21, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department added eight North 
Korean entities to the sanctions list, and on April 6, 2006, the department issued a 
provision prohibiting any U.S. person from “owning, leasing, operating or insuring any 
vessel flagged by North Korea.”108 
The measures are part of an administration strategy to increase pressure on 
Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program and implement the statement of 
principles of September 19, 2006. The strategy includes the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI), which is designed to intercept WMDs and WMD-related materials in the 
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air, on land, and at sea.109 The U.S. State Department is coordinating the administration's 
Illicit Activities Initiative, which is targeted at North Korea and designed to dry up 
Pyongyang's illicit sources of foreign exchange, such as counterfeiting and narcotics 
trafficking.110  
Pyongyang views Washington's economic sanctions as an effort to topple the 
North Korean government and is refusing to return to the six-party talks until the imposed 
sanctions are lifted. The sanctions appear to have affected North Korea's international 
transactions and legitimate trade.111 Since Executive Order 13382 is aimed at WMD 
proliferators and their supporters, the target of U.S. sanctions is open to interpretation by 
U.S. executive branch agencies. Two of the eight entities sanctioned in October 2005—
Korea Mining Development Corporation and Korea Ryonbong General Corporation—
were targeted for being the parent companies of firms engaged in proliferation 
activities.112  
Though strategy of applying sanctions has its own validity, this is not a balanced 
option for several reasons: the United States may not have the economic leverage to 
squeeze North Korea; Seoul and Beijing that have the leverage would maintain their 
engagement policy.  
3.  Military Containment 
Proponents of this option point to three key reasons why hard power is the correct 
engagement policy for North Korea. First, economic engagement or appeasement of 
North Korea places blind faith in North Korea's ability to reform and does not build a 
coalition with the ability to respond to North Korea when needed. Opting for engagement 
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strategies such as South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” toward North Korea buys time for the 
regime and fails to reveal the North’s unchanged intentions. Second, if North Korea 
reverts to brinkmanship tactics and bad “attention-inducing” behavior, then the likely 
American response will be a punitive one.113 It is better to out the intentions of North 
Korea early and deal with them rather than wasting time. Third, if and when all other 
engagement strategies fail, military responses like preemptive action, massive retaliatory 
strikes (in response to a North Korean missile launch or artillery barrage), food 
distribution centers off North Korean shores and borders, and guarantees of safe havens 
for refugees should be taken.    
Those who favor military action to resolve the North Korean problem feel now is 
the time to engage North Korea militarily to prevent any opportunity for the North 
Koreans to export technology to terrorists. A weakened North Korean military force, with 
a population starving and in desperate need of help, indicates an opportunity for decisive 
military action.114 In the event that North Korea transfers nuclear material, the use of 
military force cannot be ruled out because the proliferation of a nuclear weapon or 
material to a terrorist group may pose the biggest threat to U.S. security.115  
Even so, a range of military options might be considered not as a direct action, but 
as a threat because most analysts worry about the possibility of a devastating North 
Korean retaliation on either South Korea or Japan, the uncertainty of Chinese reaction, 
the burden on the U.S. military, and the global cost of war in a economically vibrant 
region. When the Clinton administration considered military action on North Korea’s 
nuclear facilities in 1993, estimates of human casualties from an invasion totaled 52,000 
U.S. military and nearly half a million South Korean soldiers dead or wounded, with an  
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untold number of civilian deaths.116 The possibility of striking North Korea’s nuclear 
facilities is considered unlikely to be successful, given the lack of information about 
unidentified nuclear facilities.117  
4.  Other Options 
Some commentators have suggested that the U.S. military is overstretched, so 
they should be gradually withdrawn in pace with U.S. strategic change.118 In other words, 
they insist that United States forces Korea should be withdrawn in return for 
abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear ambition. However, even if the United States 
maintained its forces in Japan and elsewhere in Asia, the U.S. will unlikely cede its 
current leadership in the Korean Peninsula.  
Some analysts maintain that North Korea will never be willing to give up its 
nuclear weapons, so accepting North Korea into the “nuclear club” and pressing for it to 
become a responsible nuclear power is the most realistic option. In this scenario, North 
Korea would be pushed to make nonproliferation commitments and develop non-military 
purposed nuclear development under IAEA inspection. However, considering the deep-
gorged distrust of the U.S. toward North Korea, the U.S. would not accept North Korea’s 
nuclear status, as is the case for India, Pakistan, and Israel.  
B. CHINA 
Beijing has been too cautious and lenient toward Pyongyang and limited itself to 
behind-the-scenes attempts to influence the hermit kingdom diplomatically, without 
being willing to get tough and use real leverage. China and the DPRK have hailed their 
continuously strengthened friendship during the course of their 55-year diplomatic 
relationship.119 However one conspicuous and evolving dynamic is that China and the 
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United States have entered a new era of bilateral relations through their post-September 
11 cooperation in the war on terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell described the 
state of U.S.–China relations in 2006 as the best that they have been in more than 30 
years.120 
Although some may wonder what leverage Beijing holds over Pyongyang, 
China’s role as a sincere broker appears indispensable to craft a solution to the nuclear 
crisis, considering the decades-long legacy of deep hostility and mistrust between the 
United States and the DPRK.  
Recently China has surprisingly departed from its traditionally low-profile 
diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula with an explicit message that North Korea must put 
an end to its nuclear weapons program. This decisiveness contrasts sharply with Beijing’s 
non-intervention policy, which it held in the first North Korean nuclear crisis, when it 
emphasized that “the issue was a direct matter between the DPRK and the three sides—
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United States, and the Republic of 
Korea.”121 
Ten years later, however, security concerns along its northeastern border have 
prompted Beijing’s more active diplomacy, because a nuclear North Korea could 
seriously undermine the regional stability underlying China’s economic growth. China’s 
relations with its other neighbors have improved, facilitating its economic and strategic 
interests. China has forged friendly, cooperative relations with countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in a joint 
effort to fight terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and it has also promoted economic 
cooperation with India, which improved its sometimes prickly relations with its 
southwestern neighbor. 
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China’s development strategy aims to achieve a comprehensively well-off society, 
defined by Deng Xiaoping in 1984 as xiaokang shehui, or a per capita gross national 
product of $800, by 2020. China cannot afford another “lost decade” caused by domestic 
or international turmoil. Accordingly, for the past decade, the notion of concealing 
strength and waiting for opportunities (taoguang yanghui) has guided China’s diplomacy. 
This conservative practice has created a favorable international environment that 
promotes domestic development. 
To put it simply, China seeks to stabilize this border and reinforce the status quo. 
Neither a North Korean nuclear program nor regime instability, much less regime change, 
serves those interests. In October 2004, China acknowledged for the first time 
Pyongyang’s intention to conduct a uranium-enrichment program.122 A scenario in which 
the U.S. military attacks against the DPRK cannot be completely ruled out. If this were to 
happen, Beijing’s 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with 
the DPRK would force Beijing to be involved in an upsetting confrontation with the 
United States, threatening China’s well-maintained economic growth, with one estimate 
predicting a reduction in growth of 10 to 20 percent.123  
Refugees from North Korea is another security concern for China. In July 2004, 
468 North Korean border crossers reportedly were airlifted to Seoul through a Southeast 
Asian country.124 When President George W. Bush pressed the DPRK with the North 
Korean Human Rights Act in October 2004, authorizing $20 million annually until 2008 
to help DPRK refugees, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged foreign diplomats in China 
to refuse to protect North Korean asylum seekers and instead punish them in accordance 
with Chinese law.125 
Accompanying these security concerns is China’s desire to build positive relations 
with the United States. U.S. preoccupation with Iraq has increased the value of China’s 
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shared interest in a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Beyond the war in Iraq, divergent 
approaches within the Bush administration and a lack both of military and diplomatic 
means for dealing with Kim Jong-il’s regime have paralyzed Washington. Beijing, 
however, enjoys political and economic leverage over Pyongyang and therefore could be 
a valuable partner to play hardball. During the past few years, as China and the United 
States have substantially improved their relationship, the North Korean issue 
conveniently created a new synergy between the two countries. In such a context, the 
traditional “lips and teeth” relationship between China and the DPRK, in which Beijing 
envisioned using North Korea as a buffer against the United States, appears both obsolete 
and self-destructive. 
Since the initial disclosure of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium program in 
October 2002, Beijing has expressed its willingness to host dialogues for interested 
parties while continuing to stress dialogue and negotiation as the most effective means to 
settle the nuclear issue.126 Since April 2003, China has hosted one trilateral negotiation 
and three rounds of six-party talks. Beijing has gone beyond its initial role as a host, 
assuming further responsibilities as peacemaker and mediator. Besides providing the 
venue, China also mapped out the framework for negotiations, mediated between 
disagreeing parties, and has worked hard to get the talks back on track since they stalled 
in September 2004. To reenergize the talks, Hu reaffirmed with Bush both sides’ 
determination to continue multilateral negotiations during a phone conversation on 
October 7, 2004. Beijing also sent out its special envoy, Ambassador Ning Fukui, to 
shuttle between South Korea and the United States to discuss ways to bring North Korea 
back to the negotiation table. China’s efforts to facilitate talks have been substantial and 
internationally regarded as constructive. As Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly remarked, “Achievements from the talks are in no 
small part due to the extensive efforts of the Chinese… and we are extremely grateful for 
the hard work they have been doing.127 
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On the other hand, Bush’s branding of North Korea as a member of the “axis of 
evil” or “rogue state” along with Iraq and Iran raised great concern in China about a 
rising unilateralist trend in U.S. foreign policy. Although China sees eye to eye with the 
United States on the need for North Korea to denuclearize, China is against the use of 
“axis of evil” rhetoric in international relations and issued an early warning within days 
of the 2002 U.S. State of the Union address, saying that “consequences will be very 
serious if the U.S. proceeds with this kind of logic.”128 Beijing seems to take North 
Korea’s security concerns seriously and considers that the “axis of evil” rhetoric, coupled 
with the United States’ toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, has presumably 
heightened North Korea’s fears about security.  
China’s attitude during the last two years of talks, however, has shown a cautious 
but clear change. Especially in comparison to relations 50 years ago, China no longer 
provides blind support to North Korea. In other words, the Chinese leadership has 
indicated to Kim Jong-il that reluctance on Pyongyang’s part to dismantle its nuclear 
weapons program would severely hamper Beijing’s ability and willingness to 
continuously offer aid. This was expressed in Hu’s three suggestions to Pyongyang in 
August 2003, encouraging North Korea to attain economic self-sufficiency, try reform, 
and improve relations with its neighbors by halting its weapons of mass destruction 
program.129 On February 12, 2003, China voted for a resolution in the IAEA that accused 
North Korea of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and referred the 
issue to the UN Security Council. China has generally refrained from using its lifeline 
assistance, which is believed to account for 70 to 90 percent of North Korea’s fuel and 
one-third of its food imports, to exert economic pressure on North Korea. China even cut 
off its oil supplies to North Korea for three days in March 2003 for North Korea’s 
boycott of six-party talks.  
Even so, China rarely uses sanctions in its diplomacy. Beijing doubts the 
effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea. Whenever the U.S. has made a threat 
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against it, Pyongyang has always retaliated with more hawkish rhetoric. On July 4, 2003, 
China and Russia voted against a proposed Security Council resolution condemning 
North Korea’s nuclear program and withdrawal from the NPT, believing that such a 
resolution would only provoke North Korea.  
Instead, China recommends that the DPRK attain economic self-sufficiency and 
try Chinese-style reform. The multilateral talks provide a platform to expose North Korea 
to this idea and motivate it to reform through interaction with various parties who are 
equally eager to see changes in Pyongyang. Having already shown Kim Jong-il the 
benefits of the economic changes taking place in China, Beijing must convince him that a 
controlled market economy can best reduce political and social risks, maintaining North 
Korea’s own regime.  
C. JAPAN 
Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has pursued normalization of relations with 
the North in anticipation that it would better serve regional peace and stability and could 
put an end to its burdensome post-war settlement issues. Similarly, North Korea seemed 
to acknowledge that improved relations with Japan would be vital for reviving its failed 
economy. Thus, Japan-DPRK normalization offered incentives to both parties and 
normalization was considered both a key to opening up the North to the international 
community and a major inducement for it to give up its nuclear programs. However, as 
Pyongyang failed to remove the obstacle of the abduction issue by providing more 
transparency on what happened to the abductees and shows unwillingness to resolve the 
nuclear issue, normalization talks between the two countries has been faltering.130 
While Japan’s policy was under pressure at home by the abduction issue, North 
Korea dropped another bombshell. On February 10, 2005 the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry unexpectedly declared the possession of nuclear weapons and also announced  
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that it would not participate in the six-party talks.131 Because of the North’s previous 
signals of appeasement toward Japan, this was viewed as even more provocative in the 
eyes of the Japanese.  
In response, the Japanese government clearly stated its position that it will not 
improve relations with North Korea without solving the nuclear issue as well as the 
abduction issue by banning remittances from Koreans in Japan, and stopping North 
Korean ships from entering Japanese ports.132 The momentum built up by the Pyongyang 
declaration dissipated in the high winds of negative public opinion within Japan as 
nuclear-related tension spread across the entire Northeast Asian region. It was reported 
that surveys showed that 70% of the Japanese people supported sanctions.133  
When looking more broadly at the North Korean problem, careful consideration 
must be given to another aspect. Japan finds ample justification in the North Korean 
threat for advancing its goal of becoming a “normal state.” As North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons and missile development pose credible threats not only to Japan’s security but 
also to the region’s peace and stability, and the United States has been encouraging Japan 
to assume more international responsibilities, Japan has been working diligently to 
improve its defense posture, modernize its military, and try to expand its international 
role. In order to support this effort, though the “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” 
(EDOP) requires that military forces cannot be exercised until armed attack has been 
initiated,134 Japan has pushed for new legislations of a series of emergency laws, revision 
of existing laws and bilateral treaties, and even constitutional amendments regarding 
Japan’s responsibilities in the U.S.-Japan alliance framework, and more broadly in U.N. 
operations. 
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Under the current circumstances, Japan no longer hesitates to implement hard-line 
policy options against the North. Japan is acting in concert with the United States to 
further strengthen its participation in the PSI and missile defense, and at the same time it 
also executes its own unilateral sanctions to put more intense pressure on North Korea 
while consistently taking advantage of North Korean nuclear ambition for the purpose of 
being a “normal state.” 
New Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said that he would drop the hostile policies 
against North Korea previously held by his predecessor, Abe. In his first policy speech to 
parliament on October 1, 2007, Fukuda said, “Together with efforts to return the Japanese 
abductees, I will do my utmost to resolve historical disputes and normalize ties with 
North Korea.”135 While some analysts say that Japan may ultimately control the pace of 
the turnaround in its policies toward North Korea, given its anti-North Korean sentiment, 
some Japanese media also reported that the Fukuda administration would extend 
economic sanctions, which are due to expire on October 13, 2007, against North 
Korea.136  
D. RUSSIA 
At the end of Yeltin’s presidency (1992-1999), Russia was in disarray. The 
economy was in limbo, political power was divided, and foreign policy was adrift. Under 
Putin, Russia’s economy is witnessing steady growth due mainly to high oil prices, 
centralized political power, and improved foreign policy. President Putin’s foreign policy 
is characterized by pragmatism, balance, and realism. Putin believes that Russia’s 
development of Russian Far East and security structures of the Asia-Pacific region will 
provide the momentum for Russia’s overall economic development and guarantee its 
security.  
In Russia’s Northeast Asia policy, Korea takes up a special place due to Korea’s 
geostrategic location, North Korea’s nuclear crisis, and Russia’s enormous potential for 
                                                 




economic cooperation with the two Koreas especially in the field of energy and 
transportation. Russia’s goals and interests vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula may be 
summarized as follows: Russia is opposed to any power dominating the Korean 
Peninsula. Since Korea is geostrategically important for Russia’s Far East policy, Russia 
considers Korea’s domination by one alien power a direct and grave threat to its security. 
Thus, Russia will keep on putting forth every effort to minimize U.S., Chinese, or 
Japanese influence over the Korean Peninsula. Russia’s new foreign policy adapted in 
April 2000 made a special statement that “Russia’s efforts will be concentrated on 
ensuring our country’s full and equal participation in efforts to settle the Korean problem 
and on maintaining balanced relations with both Korean states.”137  
Russia wants to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Russia 
does not want security instability since it would inevitably disrupt Russia’s endeavor to 
grow its economy and implement reforms at home. In particular, chaos caused by North 
Korean nuclear weapons and its succeeding influx of Korean refugees into Russia would 
deeply threaten the security and the prosperity of Russia.138  
For these reasons, Putin tries to maintain an even-handed relationship with the 
two Koreas. Departing from the pro-Seoul direction and the uneven policy of his 
predecessors such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Putin has sought to maintain a balanced 
relationship with the divided Korean states. The new 2000 foreign policy concept reflects 
Russia’s intention to be a more active actor in the Korean peace process and a balancer 
between the two Koreas. Russia’s rapprochement with North Korea in 2000 was a 
product of Putin’s pragmatic foreign policy line.139  
Russia’s policies on North Korea’s nuclear problem boil down to three principles. 
First, North Korea should dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. Russia fears that 
North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would destabilize Northeast Asia and 
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cause a nuclear arms race in the region, in addition to disrupting its economic 
development. Second, North Korea’s nuclear crisis should be resolved through dialogue 
and negotiations. Russia stresses diplomatic negotiations before economic sanctions or 
military options. In this sense, Russia rejected U.S. attempts to impose sanctions on 
North Korea until North Korea’s missile tests in July 2006 and its nuclear weapons 
explosion in October 2006. Lastly, the international community should satisfy North 
Korea’s needs in exchange for North Korea’s denuclearization. Russia has pointed out 
the necessity of political normalization, security guarantee, and economic assistance in 
order to resolve North Korea’s nuclear crisis and bring about everlasting peace and 
security in the Korean Peninsula.140  
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V. INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF NUCLEAR CRISIS 
A. FIRST NUCLEAR CRISIS AND U.S.-NORTH KOREA MEETING 
North Korea signed the NPT in 1985. In a denuclearization agreement signed in 
December 1991, North Korea and South Korea pledged not to possess nuclear weapons, 
not to possess plutonium or uranium enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual 
nuclear inspection system. In January 1992, North Korea signed a safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA, which required North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA 
and gave the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North Korean nuclear 
installations and programs. In 1992, North Korea rebuffed South Korea regarding 
implementation of the denuclearization agreement, but it did allow the IAEA to conduct 
six inspections during the period June 1992 to February 1993.141  
In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more 
plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the agency. The IAEA Board of 
Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993, urging North Korea to extend full 
cooperation to the IAEA and to permit access to these sites. North Korea continued to 
refuse, and on March 12 sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General stating its intention to 
withdraw from the NPT. On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution urging 
North Korea to reconsider its stated intention to withdraw from the NPT and to comply 
with its NPT safeguards agreement. The Security Council invited all U.N. members to 
support that effort. This set the stage for direct U.S.-North Korea talks.142 
On June 11, 1993, following talks in New York, the United States and North 
Korea issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal 
from the NPT. In a separate statement, the United States also noted that the dialogue  
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could continue only if North Korea avoided certain steps including additional 
reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the 
NPT.143 
In May 1994, North Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel 
rods that it had removed from the five-megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North Korea’s 
President Kim Il-sung reactivated a longstanding invitation to former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim offered Carter a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear 
facilities and operations. Kim took the initiative after China reportedly informed him that 
it would not veto a first round of economic sanctions, which the Clinton administration 
had proposed to members of the U.N. Security Council. According to former Defense 
Secretary William Perry, the Pentagon also developed a contingency plan to bomb the 
Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North Korea began to reprocess the 8,000 stored fuel rods. 
The Clinton administration reacted to Kim’s proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal 
and entering into a new round of high-level negotiations with North Korea.144  
A further step was taken at the next round of talks, which were held in Geneva 
from July 14-19, 1994. In the joint statement issued at the close of these discussions, 
North Korea agreed that it was “prepared to begin” consultations with the IAEA on 
outstanding issues and with South Korea on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue. 
The United States made clear that continuation of dialogue would require continuation of 
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The United States agreed that it was prepared to support substitution of light 
water reactors for North Korean graphite-moderated reactors as part of a broad and 
thorough solution to the nuclear issue. Light water reactors are not optimal producers of 
plutonium for nuclear weapons programs and can be more effectively safeguarded than 
North Korea's current graphite moderated reactors. 
On October 21, 1994, after sixteen months of negotiations, the United States and 
North Korea signed an Agreed Framework, designed to lead to an end of the threat of 
proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, and to provide the basis for more normal relations 
between North Korea and the rest of the world. 
In the Agreed Framework, North Korea committed itself to forgo reprocessing 
and eventually ship out its spent fuel from its existing 5 MWe reactor; immediately 
freeze, and later eliminate, its entire graphite-moderated reactor program under IAEA 
monitoring; and to remain in the NPT and ultimately allow full implementation of its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including special inspections.146  
The Agreed Framework also provided that the United States would organize an 
international consortium to supply two light-water reactors to North Korea to replace the 
graphite reactor program which is terminated under the Agreed Framework. However, no 
critical components were to be supplied until North Korea satisfied the IAEA that it was 
in full compliance with its NPT obligations.147 
In 1997 the United States and North Korea continued to implement the Agreed 
Framework. North Korea froze its nuclear program, the freeze was verified by a 
continuous IAEA presence at the Yongbyon site, and virtually all of North Korea's spent 
fuel was stored in sealed canisters under IAEA safeguards. The United States, along with 
the Republic of Korea and Japan, organized the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO), which allowed North Korea the provision of two South Korean 
model 1,000 MWe light-water reactors (LWR). KEDO membership now includes 11 
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states and the European Union. South Korea and Japan committed to fund the bulk of the 
LWR project through KEDO. Further, the United States and KEDO delivered another 
annual quota of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea for heating and electricity 
production in 1997. As part of the Agreed Framework, the United States agreed to 
arrange to supply this oil in order to compensate for the energy forgone due to the freeze 
on North Korea's reactors.148 
The Agreed Framework does not rely on trust. All of its steps are verifiable. If 
fully implemented, the Agreed Framework will defuse one of the most dangerous nuclear 
hot spots in the world and will ultimately resolve this nonproliferation threat. Since the 
inception of the agreement, North Korea has halted construction and operation activities 
at its reactors, cooperated in storing its spent fuel without reprocessing, and allowed 
IAEA monitoring of its nuclear facilities. However, it has not yet allowed “special 
inspections” pursuant to its NPT safeguards agreement. 
B. SECOND NUCLEAR CRISIS AND SIX-PARTY TALKS 
In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence to 
support suspicions that North Korea was engaged in procurement activities for the 
development of a uranium enrichment program. On October 4, 2002 James Kelly 
confronted the North Koreans in a meeting in Pyongyang with the U.S. evidence for the 
uranium enrichment program and the North Koreans admitted to it.149 Since then, North 
Korea's uranium enrichment program issue has surfaced and remains a critical obstacle in 
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conceal any enrichment facility underground. However, in the late 1980s, North Korea 
was already acquiring dual-use equipment that could be used for uranium metal 
processing and applied to a uranium enrichment program.150 
Following the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the United States and 
North Korea declared their intention to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but the 
two sides disagreed on the format for diplomacy. Washington insisted upon a multilateral 
format, but Pyongyang demanded a bilateral setting. The two sides eventually 
compromised and agreed to hold trilateral talks with China in Beijing April 23–25, 
2003.151 After this meeting, the Bush administration approached South Korea and Japan 
and pledged to include them in future meetings. Four months later, the first six-party talk 
was held in China that included Russia as well.  
The second round of six-party talks was held from 25–28 February 2004 with no 
real progress. Many reports indicated that it was a tactical victory by Pyongyang in the 
way it crafted the talks into an excuse to do nothing.152 Furthermore, North Korea 
watchers contended that the U.S. was playing into Pyongyang’s calculations to stall the 
talks until the presidential elections in November 2004 to see if they could get a better 
deal with a new administration, or worse yet, to give itself eight more months to continue 
its development of nuclear weapons.153 Indeed, the third round of the talks, held from 
23–26 June 2004 in Beijing, showed little progress. The U.S., however, was seen as 
softening its stance when it offered Pyongyang a series of incentives, including a 
significant infusion of foreign aid. Still the Bush administration had previously insisted 
on complete disarmament as a first step to improved relations and aid. It was reported 
that Washington was prodded by China, South Korea, and Japan to abandon its hard-line 
                                                 
150 Daniel A. Pinkston, “When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?” CNS 
Research Story, October 28, 2002, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/pdf/nkpaki2.pdf (accessed June 23, 2007). 
151 David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Material,” New York Times, April 
25, 2003, A1. 
152 See (author unattributed), “No Surprise from North Korean Talks,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Hong Kong, March 11, 2004. 
153 See (author unattributed), “North Korea Waits for Kerry,” Christian Science Monitor, Boston, MA, 
March 2004 ; Also see Mark Magnier and Babara Demick, “Pyongyang May Stall During Nuclear Talks, 
Hoping for Better Deal for a New President,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2004. 
 62
stance.154 Then, in July 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with North Korea’s 
foreign minister in what was the highest level meeting between the two countries in two 
years. The meeting lasted for about 20 minutes and both sides tried to clarify their 
positions on proposals advanced during the third round of six-party talks in June. From 
all indications, however, there was no real progress to speak of as North Korea remained 
guarded and did not offer any compromises on its nuclear weapons program.155 
After a long break, the fourth round of six-party talks resumed in July 2005. Even 
though the meeting was not fruitful, in the succeeding meeting in September 2005 after 
the three-week recess due to ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the party members were 
able to come to an agreement and announced a joint statement at its conclusion. It was 
considered a productive meeting, and the joint statement contained six points. The first 
point reaffirmed that the party members agreed that the goal of these talks would lead to 
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful way. Within this point, North 
Korea announced that it had a right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, 
would fully quit its nuclear program, and would return to both and NPT and IAEA 
safeguards in the near future. The United States, in turn, announced that it had no nuclear 
weapons on the peninsula and that it had no intention of attacking North Korea with 
either nuclear or conventional weapons. South Korea stated that it did not have nuclear 
weapons within its territory, that it would not accept them in the future, and that the 1992 
joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed. The 
other party members stated their respect for this goal and agreed to discuss supplying 
North Korea with light-water reactors at the appropriate time.156 
In the second point, all party members agreed to recognize each state, using 
international norms and relations. Within this point, North Korea and the United States 
agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty, and to take steps to normalize relations. North 
Korea and Japan agreed to take steps to normalize their relationship as well. 
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The third point addressed the cooperation to promote energy, trade, and 
investment either in a bilateral or multilateral environment. Within this point, all party 
members agreed to assist North Korea with meeting its energy needs. The last three 
points were aimed at improving regional stability, advancing the talks in a productive 
manner, and agreeing to meet again in November 2005.157 
While the six-party talks addressed six points, the ones that stood out involved 
North Korea’s agreeing to stop its nuclear program and to return to the NPT, and the 
statement of intention to provide light-water reactors to North Korea at a time to be 
determined in the future. The latter statement jumped to the forefront when North Korea 
made an announcement the following day. In less than twenty-four hours, North Korea 
announced it would not abandon its nuclear program unless it received light-water 
reactors first. This comment not only drew attention and criticism within the United 
States, but also from the other party members. Tension about this provision remained 
high through the next round of talks that were held in November.158 
As speculated, the talks in November 2005 were not as productive as the previous 
meeting. The only item that resulted from the talks was that another full meeting would 
be scheduled for December 2005 or January 2006, and that bilateral and working level 
type meetings should continue until the next full meeting. The provision dealing with the 
light-water reactor was brought up by North Korea, but it was not pressed further. South 
Korea, Japan, and China agreed that North Korea should abandon its program before 
discussing the light-water reactor subject.159 
Against such a hard-nosed attitude from the North Koreans, the United States 
decided to impose financial sanctions in March 2006. These sanctions were applied to 
accounts North Korea held in a Macao-based bank, which were linked with WMD  
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proliferation activity and money laundering. The United States had placed sanctions 
against other North Korean accounts in June, which were suspected in WMD 
proliferation activities.  
Under these acute circumstances, strenuous Chinese diplomacy produced a 
meeting between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean 
Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan on October 31, 2006. North Korea agreed to a U.S. 
proposal that resumed six-party talks would include a U.S. – North Korea bilateral 
“working group” to address the issue of U.S. financial sanctions and North Korean illegal 
activities. North Korea had boycotted the six-party talks since November 2005, 
demanding that the Bush administration lift financial sanctions against a bank in the 
Chinese territory of Macau that the U.S. Treasury charged was a conduit for North 
Korean money laundering connected with North Korean drug trafficking and exports of 
counterfeit U.S. currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals. 
The negotiations resumed on December 18, 2006, but ended on December 22, 
2006, without progress. North Korean negotiators refused to negotiate on the nuclear 
issue until the Bush administration agreed to end its financial sanctions against North 
Korea.160 North Korea apparently also refused to negotiate over a Chinese proposal to 
establish five working groups to negotiate on different aspects of the nuclear issue. 
Moreover, North Korea restated its previous conditions for dismantlement of its nuclear 
programs, including the demand of August-September 2005 that light water nuclear 
reactors be completely constructed in North Korea before North Korea would begin to 
dismantle nuclear programs. 
Another subject of diversion occurred when the United States and Korean 
peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) made the decision to stop all work 
on the light-water reactors, as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework. North Korea stated 
that this pullout by the United States caused a huge economic loss, and believed it was 
entitled to receive compensation for this loss. Other party members agreed with the 
United States that this issue should be solved bilaterally and not as part of the six-party 
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talks.161 During that time, too, North Korea demanded that the United States supply it 
with heavy oil. North Korea also called for the talks to negotiate “nuclear disarmament” 
in Northeast Asia, which Pyongyang has defined as the acceptance by the United States 
of major reductions and limitations on its military forces and military operations in South 
Korea and Japan.162 During the six-party meeting, Kim Gye-gwan made clear that even if 
the Bush administration agreed to lift financial sanctions, it would have to make 
concessions on these North Korean conditions for a freeze and/or dismantlement of 
nuclear programs.163 Kim also indicated that any North Korean agreement to freeze its 
nuclear facilities would allow the IAEA to only monitor the freeze rather than conduct 
full IAEA inspections.164 
Prior to and during the six-party meeting, Christopher Hill called on North Korea 
to take initial steps to implement its pledge in the September 19, 2005 six-party 
statement, which stated the goal of termination of North Korea’s nuclear programs. The 
steps proposed by Hill included a freeze of the operating nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, a 
shutting down of the site of the October 9, 2006 nuclear test, admittance of the IAEA into 
North Korea with full rights of inspection, and a full disclosure by North Korea of 
nuclear programs and nuclear weapons to the IAEA. Hill also stressed that North Korea 
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report stated that Hill also specified that North Korea must freeze the five megawatt 
reactor at Yongbyon and admit the IAEA within 1.5 to 2 months. Diplomatic sources 
reported that China supported Hill’s proposed steps for North Korea.166 
In the working group meeting over U.S. financial sanctions, U.S. Treasury 
Department officials reportedly demanded that North Korea deal with “its illicit 
finance.”167 North Korean officials, however, refused to admit that North Korea had used 
Banco Delta in Macau to support illicit counterfeiting and drug trafficking.168 
On February 13, 2007, the governments taking part in the fifth round of six-party 
talks concerning nuclear disarmament of North Korea released an action plan designed to 
lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (February 13 Action Plan).169 China, 
Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea agreed to specific initial 
actions and timetables that support the objectives of terminating and eliminating North 
Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear weapons program.  
The February 13 Action Plan builds upon a previous joint statement issued after 
the fourth round of six-party talks on September 19, 2005 (September 19 Joint 
Statement), according to which North Korea “committed to abandoning all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programs.”170 Efforts to achieve this objective were set 
back by North Korea’s July 2006 missile firings over the Sea of Japan and its October 
                                                 
166 Noke Naoko, “6-way talks extended a day to Friday, differences remain,” Kyodo News (Tokyo), 
December 20, 2006; “U.S. to N. Korea. 2 months to move on denuclearization,” Dow Jones Commodities 
Service, December 27, 2006. Sukhorukov, Alexei, “U.S. demands that N. Korea liquidate nuke program in 
2 months,” Itar-Tass World Service (Moscow), December 27, 2006. 
167 Ibid; Aoki Naoko, “6-way talks extended a day to Friday, differences remain,” Kyodo News 
(Tokyo), December 20, 2006. 
168 “N. Korea refuses U.S. Treasury’s financial reports on BDA bank accounts,” Dong-A Ilbo (internet 
version), December 20, 2006. 
169 “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” available at 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm, February 13, 2007 (hereinafter “February 13 Action 
Plan” or “Action Plan”) (accessed August 23, 2007). 
170 “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2005/Sep/19-187747.html?chanlid=washfile, September 19, 2005 
(hereinafter “September 19 Joint Statement” or “Joint Statement”) (accessed June 3, 2007). 
 67
2006 announcement of a successful underground test of a nuclear weapon.171 These 
North Korean actions led to Security Council Resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006), 
condemning the actions and making certain legally binding decisions, including that 
North Korea “shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a 
complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.”172  
By the terms of the February 13 Action Plan, North Korea agreed that, within 60 
days, it would shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the 
Yongbyon nuclear facility. In exchange, the five parties agreed to provide North Korea 
with up to one million tons of fuel oil and other economic and humanitarian assistance, 
and Japan and the United States pledged to move toward normalizing relations with 
North Korea. The Action Plan also announced the establishment of five working groups 
tasked with discussing and formulating specific plans for the implementation of the 
September 19 Joint Statement. It, however, did not address the status of North Korean 
membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or contain any provisions on 
this issue, although North Korea committed in the September 19 Joint Statement to 
returning to the NPT “at an early date.” 
The Action Plan does not immediately obligate North Korea to abandon its 
plutonium nuclear weapons program, only to “freeze” it, and it does not impose any 
immediate obligations concerning North Korea’s nuclear weapons program utilizing 
highly enriched uranium. In addition, North Korea agreed to invite back inspectors from 
the IAEA in order to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications related to the 
shutting down and sealing of the Yongbyon facility, but this commitment was qualified 
by language indicating that the scope of such inspections will be “agreed between IAEA 
and DPRK” at a later date. 
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The parties to the Action Plan have made political commitments to take specific 
steps toward North Korea’s disarmament, but the Action Plan does not constitute a treaty 
creating legal obligations. For an international agreement to be considered a treaty, the 
parties must enter into the agreement with the intent that international law governs it.173 
The February 13 Action Plan is an unsigned recitation of “initial actions” for 
implementing the non-binding September 19 Joint Statement, and the Action Plan 
contains no indication that the parties intended to create international legal obligations. 
The only concrete measures are the shutting down and sealing of North Korea’s 
Yongbyon facility and the provision of an initial 50,000 tons of fuel oil to North Korea. 
The remaining actions listed in the Action Plan are procedural, such as the commitments 
by Japan and the United States to start bilateral talks with North Korea on normalizing 
relations, or involve the establishment of working groups to carry out the Action Plan’s 
provisions.  
Additionally, the Action Plan cannot be construed as containing statements from 
any party that might be binding under international law. The Action Plan involves heavily 
negotiated commitments finalized in a form that reveals the parties’ intention not to be 
bound by international law. For a statement or declaration to create international legal 
obligations, the state in question has to make the statement with the intent to be bound by 
it under international law.174 Given the negotiated, reciprocal commitments in the 
February 13 Action Plan and the lack of any reference to legal obligations, North Korea’s 
pronouncements in the February 13 Action Plan do not bind North Korea under 
international law. 
Although not a binding international agreement, the February 13 Action Plan is an 
important and substantial step toward the goal of eliminating North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program, and if implemented, it would move North Korea toward compliance 
with the binding demands for WMD disarmament made by the Security Council.  
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Continuing the ongoing negotiations with North Korea has both potential positive 
and negative outcomes. The positive outcomes may include a denuclearized Korean 
peninsula and regional stability, while the negative outcomes potentially include 
indefinite instability in the region and a potential implosion of North Korea. Reviewing 
the past events with North Korea, it is not hard to envision the potential negative 
consequences. North Korea relies heavily on China for its support, although the ROK has 
also provided limited assistance. It is neither in China’s nor the ROK’s interest for the 
state of North Korea either to continue in isolation or to implode. Both scenarios would 
impose an economic strain on each of them, as a potential flood of North Koreans would 
spill over into both countries. 
In addition, other potential pitfalls exist in the continuation of six-party talks. 
North Korea could raise other issues and attempt to include them as part of the six-party 
agenda. For example, human rights issues could cause the talks to deadlock and grind to a 
halt. As North Korea opens up to the international community and global market, so will 
its vulnerabilities to international norms. In this respect, its reclusive nature has protected 
its authoritarian regime from outside prying eyes. The potential for this issue to rise to the 
top of the agenda is real, because China is known for its past human rights abuses. China, 
as the most powerful influence on North Korea, would also be inviting such scrutiny 
upon itself as these talks successfully make progress. 
Slow progress may also prevent the six-party talks from reaching their goal. North 
Korea may draw attention to the similarity of the current progression of talks compared 
with the 1994 Agreed Framework. If the party members are brought into this argument, 
this could cause the talks to disintegrate. At any time, if one of the other party members 
supports any one of the arguments the North Koreans may make, this endeavor will 
surely fail. Successful cooperation among all countries involved in dealing with North 
Korea is the key to success. 
It is a complicated path, and at the same time an optimistic goal, to envision a 
denuclearized Korean peninsula and regional stability. The United States and members in 
the region were initially heading down that path in 1994 when the Agreed Framework 
was established. The Agreed Framework was a good deal for North Korea, and had this 
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agreement continued through to the end. North Korea would have been able to receive 
the light-water reactors, heavy fuel oil at no cost, diplomatic relations with the United 
States, lifting of the United States economic embargo, and most likely a United States 
nuclear security guarantee. In return, North Korea would have frozen its nuclear program, 
would have come into full compliance with the Safeguards Agreement, would have 
provided accurate disposition of the discharged fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor, and 
would have dismantled its nuclear facilities.175 
Through the six-party talks, similar goals for North Korea are available. It 
remains in the best interest overall if North Korea complies with CVID(Complete, 
verifiable and Irreversible Dismantlement). When this situation is achieved on the 
peninsula and it receives the commitments from all party members, the region is destined 
to increase in stability. As relations and trust grow between the countries involved along 
with the potential programs countries have stated they would support pending the 
outcome of a denuclearized peninsula, North Korea could potentially emerge as the 
biggest winner. 
As the region becomes more stable, the potential for greater trade increases. North 
Korea could be the stimulus for trade to increase, as it would be a great source of labor. If 
this occurs, the peninsula as a whole will benefit. Once North Korea complies with CVID 
principles of its nuclear program, a potential increase in business, technology, and 
commercial trading will follow. As its neighbor on the peninsula, the ROK would benefit 
both directly and indirectly from the increased trade. All the other members in the region 
would also indirectly benefit from this activity. 
The potential for peace and stability in the region remains an attainable goal as 
long as the party members continue to have dialogue. September 2005 joint statement, 
February 2006 action plan, when compared with the first three rounds of talks, are 
distinct evolvement in the six-party talks. As the six-party talks continue to meet and 
make progress, however small, it will be up to all the members to remain focused on the 
goal. North Korea will probably continue to extend these talks indefinitely, as it will 
                                                 
175 Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” CRS Report for Congress, Order 
Code IB 91141, January 27, 2005. 
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benefit from this action. Communication diffused the tension during the 1994 crisis on 
the peninsula, and communication will be the key to accomplishing the goal of a 
denuclearized Korean peninsula, and potentially a reunified, denuclearized Korea. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As seen above, there are three important variables that are the key to resolving the 
North Korean nuclear crisis: North Korea’s policy change, the United States’s will to 
change the DPRK, and China’s role as an active mediator. Surely Japan and Russia can 
also make small yet important contributions to the cooperation. By looking into the first 
and second North Korean nuclear crisis and the historical background of the crisis and 
six-party talks, we can speculate what the outcome of talks will be in the next six-party 
talks slated by the end of 2007. Despite the effort through bilateral and multilateral talks 
in history, many analysts believe that the talks have reached deadlock, and despite two 
and a half years of diplomacy, they do not expect a denuclearized Korean peninsula. 
Why? What is missing? A conspicuous obstacle still remains: the commitment (trust) 
problem.  
According to the “U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement” on June 11, 1993, Washington 
had already agreed to provide assurances against the use of force, including the use of 
nuclear weapons.176 And according to the “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué” on October 
12, 2000, Washington and Pyongyang agreed that “neither government would have 
hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to 
make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity.”177 In 
addition to these statements in the U.S.-DPRK talks, the U.S. affirmed in the six-party 
talks that it has no intention to attack or invade North Korea and will provide a security 
guarantee. North Korea, however, still has grave security concerns. Since many North 
Korean officials probably believe the Bush administration is determined to topple Kim 
Jong-il and the Korean Workers Party, the commitment problem might be 
insurmountable until Washington undergoes ‘regime change’ in January 2009. 
                                                 
176 “U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement,” June 11, 1993, 
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North Korea acknowledges the commitment problem in resolving the nuclear 
crisis, and Pyongyang insists that the U.S. provision of a light water reactor (LWR) will 
resolve this problem. While the U.S. delivery of an LWR would symbolize a U.S. sense 
of trust, it is unclear how an LWR project would eliminate the underlying mistrust that 
has lasted for over half a century. While Washington is correct in pointing out the 
severity of Pyongyang's commitment problem given its record of reneging on numerous 
international agreements, North Korea will neither accept nor implement any negotiated 
settlement until Washington's commitment problem, as perceived by Pyongyang, is 
addressed. While the resolution of the U.S. commitment problem is necessary for the 
implementation of any agreement, the discussion of Washington's commitment problem 
is politically unpalatable in the United States. 
Although the United States needs to put in more effort to build up mutual 
confidence with North Korea, it has strengthened U.S. sanctions in the past. Ceasing to 
breathe life into North Korea, Beijing and South Korea could invite a larger influx of 
illegal border crossers and overwhelming economic and social burden that they would 
bring. Washington is less concerned about such issues, with its priority of preventing 
nuclear proliferation largely obscuring other considerations. Those who expect more hard 
power from China and South Korea ignore the fact that paving the way for regime change 
in North Korea by initiation of economic collapse is not in both countries’ interest. 
However, Beijing’s embrace of multilateralism, initiation of active intervention, and 
willingness to flex some diplomatic muscles are essential to end the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. 
The North Korean nuclear card is largely an impractical one, however, because 
either attacking the United States or selling weapons to terrorists would result in North 
Korea’s self destruction. A more reasonable solution for the DPRK would be to trade its 
nuclear card in return for help to address its more urgent security and economic needs. 
The United States also has limited choices, as the price of confrontation is much higher 
than a negotiated settlement and is altogether undesirable. Even though it will take a long 
time, scaling down the deep-rooted mistrust through “negotiations” and “engagement”  
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remains the most realistic option for both sides. Changing leadership in the U.S., Japan, 
and South Korea will usher us into another chapter of opportunity to end the North 
Korean nuclear conundrum—this time, surely with more carrots than sticks. 
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